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Abstract 
In this study, I examine whether companies are more likely to disclose revenue growth 
adjusted to remove the effects of foreign currency fluctuations (constant-currency revenue 
growth rates) when currency fluctuations decrease revenue growth (i.e., there is a currency 
headwind) than when currency fluctuations increase revenue growth. Public companies 
increasingly cite non-GAAP performance metrics when announcing earnings. While regulators 
see value in non-GAAP reporting, they continue to express concern that it is carried out 
inconsistently and in a misleading manner. Because the disclosure of constant-currency revenue 
growth is discretionary, companies have an incentive to strategically disclose it only when it 
benefits them to do so. I first create a novel proxy for the exchange rate impact on revenue and 
hand collect data on whether or not companies provide constant-currency revenue growth 
disclosures in earnings announcements. I find that when a company has a currency headwind, it 
is 146 percent more likely to disclose constant-currency growth rates. In addition, I examine 
aspects of the information environment and find some evidence suggesting that the effect 
decreases when information asymmetry is low. 
  
   
Acknowledgements 
I am especially grateful for the guidance from the members of my dissertation committee, 
Kris Allee, Cory Cassell (chair), and Mike Crawley. I also thank Allison Butler, Bowen Gong, 
Roy Schmardebeck, and seminar participants at the University of Arkansas, Utah State 
University, and the College of William and Mary for helpful comments and suggestions, as well 
as Justin Blann for his excellent research assistance. 
  
   
Dedication 
This dissertation is dedicated to my dear wife, Kelli. I am forever grateful for her support. 
  
   
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development ........................................................................... 8 
2.1. Non-GAAP Reporting ............................................................................................................. 8 
2.2. Currency Exchange Rates and Constant-Currency Growth ................................................... 11 
2.3. The Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis and Strategic Disclosure ......................................... 13 
2.4. Geographic Segment Reporting and Estimating Macroeconomic Effects ............................ 16 
2.5. Hypothesis Development ....................................................................................................... 20 
2.5.1. The Effect of Information Environment on Disclosure ...................................................... 21 
3. Variable Measurement, Research Design, and Sample Selection ............................................ 23 
3.1. Variable Measurement ........................................................................................................... 23 
3.2. Research Design ..................................................................................................................... 25 
4. Results ....................................................................................................................................... 30 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................................. 30 
4.2. Empirical Results ................................................................................................................... 37 
4.2.1. Main Tests of My Hypothesis ............................................................................................. 37 
4.2.2. Information Environment .................................................................................................... 37 
4.3. Robustness Tests .................................................................................................................... 40 
5. Headwind-Tailwind Paired Sample Analysis ........................................................................... 44 
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 44 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................................. 46 
5.3. Univariate Test of Disclosure Choice in Adjacent Quarters .................................................. 53 
5.4. Main Tests .............................................................................................................................. 56 
6. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 58 
7. References ................................................................................................................................. 60 
8. Appendices ................................................................................................................................ 66 
8.1. Appendix A: Calculating the Effect of Exchange Rate Fluctuations on Revenue Growth ... 66 
8.1.1. Example 1: Measurement Specialties Inc. Q1 2009 ........................................................... 66 
8.1.2. Example 2: Iron Mountain Inc. Q4 2008 ............................................................................ 67 
8.2. Appendix B: Variable definitions .......................................................................................... 69 
 
   1 
1. Introduction 
Public companies increasingly cite non-GAAP performance metrics when announcing 
earnings (Black et al. [2018b]). Regulators at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have expressed concern about the 
increased reliance on non-GAAP measures, which are perceived by many as potentially 
misleading reporting (Leone [2010], Rapoport [2013], Teitelbaum [2015], Bricker [2016], 
Michaels and Rapoport [2016], Rapoport [2016], Schnurr [2016], White [2016], Golden [2017]). 
Despite this concern, regulators see value in non-GAAP reporting when it is used in conjunction 
with audited financial statements, and claim that investors often request the disclosures (Siegel 
[2004], Michaels and Rapoport [2016], White [2016], Golden [2017]). According to SEC Chair 
Mary Jo White, “non-GAAP financial measures… convey, in management’s assessment, a 
clearer picture of how they see the company’s results of operations in a way that GAAP results 
alone may not convey” (White [2016]). This recognition of the potential value of non-GAAP 
reporting, combined with the view that managers use non-GAAP disclosures to mislead 
investors, has caused the FASB to consider whether improvements to financial statements are 
needed. One of the potential solutions involves disaggregating the income statement, which 
would essentially standardize some non-GAAP metrics (Golden [2017]). 
Due to the concerns over non-GAAP reporting, the SEC’s Chief Accountant recently 
called for continued research on the matter, including obtaining a better understanding of the 
determinants of non-GAAP reporting (Bricker [2017]). Recent studies show that companies use 
non-GAAP earnings to make informative disclosures and remove one-time, transitory items 
(Curtis et al. [2014], Black et al. [2018a]). Consistent with this, prior research on non-GAAP 
reporting finds that non-GAAP earnings are more value-relevant and more persistent than GAAP 
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earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan [2002], Bhattacharya et al. [2003], Brown and Sivakumar [2003], 
Frankel and Roychowdhury [2005]). However, a significant proportion of firms use non-GAAP 
earnings opportunistically by, among other things, excluding recurring expenses (Black and 
Christensen [2009], Doyle et al. [2013], Curtis et al. [2014]). 
To date, the non-GAAP literature has focused exclusively on non-GAAP earnings 
measures, despite several studies that show that revenue is value relevant (Swaminathan and 
Weintrop [1991], Davis [2002], Ertimur et al. [2003], Jegadessh and Livnat [2006], Chandra and 
Ro [2008]). Moreover, according to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), firms have increasingly 
reported a non-GAAP metric known as constant-currency revenue growth in periods when the 
dollar has strengthened (Chasan [2015]). Constant-currency revenue growth reflects a firm’s 
revenue growth adjusted to remove the effects of foreign currency fluctuations, and the metric is 
often one of the first reported in earnings announcements. In periods when the dollar strengthens, 
the translation of revenue denominated in a foreign currency reduces revenue growth when 
compared to the prior year. Thus, GAAP revenue growth will be lower than constant-currency 
revenue growth. I refer to foreign currency fluctuations that cause a decrease in revenue growth 
when compared to the prior year as “currency headwinds”. The opposite is true when the dollar 
weakens (i.e., GAAP revenue growth is higher than constant-currency revenue growth). I refer to 
the opposite as “currency tailwinds”, since the change in exchange rates accelerates revenue 
growth. Carol Tomé, the CFO of Home Depot, claims that companies strategically report 
constant-currency growth rates. According to Tomé, when the dollar weakens and boosts 
revenue growth, “you rarely hear companies point out the benefits” (Chasan [2015]). Harris and 
Rajgopal (2018) interviewed CFOs about currency reporting and state that several of the 
   3 
interviewees made similar comments. In the WSJ article, the author notes that this inconsistency 
in the reporting of constant-currency growth rates is a major a concern to the SEC. 
When managers do not disclose currency effects, prior literature suggests that it is 
possible to estimate currency effects by combing geographic segment disclosures with exchange 
rates. For example, Roberts (1989) and Li et al. (2014) find that models that combine 
macroeconomic data with geographic segments result in superior forecasts. In addition, Bartov 
and Bodnar (1994) show that investors fail to use all available information regarding foreign 
currency impacts and demonstrate that a trading strategy derived from those results earns 
abnormal returns. Taken together, these results suggest that financial statement users should be 
able to reasonably estimate foreign currency revenue impacts without management disclosure, 
although it requires more effort. 
Theory predicts that managers will strategically disclose foreign currency impacts. The 
Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis (IRH), an extension of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), proposes that information that is more costly to extract from public data is less likely to 
be impounded in stock prices (Bloomfield [2002]). Thus, managers are motivated to make it 
more difficult for investors to uncover negative information. This prediction is supported by 
prior research. For example, Schrand and Walther (2000) find that managers compare current 
earnings to prior-period earnings that exclude gains (but not losses) from the sale of property, 
plant, and equipment. Consistent with the IRH, the authors conclude that managers make these 
disclosures because they believe that investors and analysts will have a difficult time recalling 
the specifics of the prior-period gains and losses. In other words, retaining information or 
returning to prior-period earnings announcements to reacquire the information requires 
resources, and managers do not expect that investors and analysts will expend those resources. 
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Motivated by concerns by regulators about inconsistencies in the disclosure of constant-
currency growth rates, the importance of revenue for valuation, the lack of research on non-
GAAP revenue metrics, and evidence from prior literature (i.e., the IRH) on the implications of 
strategic disclosure, I examine whether companies with currency headwinds are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose constant-currency revenue growth rates than companies with currency 
tailwinds. 
I begin by creating a novel proxy that captures whether a company has a currency 
headwind. To create the proxy, FXImpact, I first identify all unique geographic segments 
disclosed in 10-K filings. Then, when possible, I associate each unique segment with a specific 
currency. For geographic segments that cannot be linked to a specific currency (e.g., “Rest of 
World, “South America”), I substitute the WSJ Dollar Index, which tracks the movement of a 
basket of currencies against the dollar. I then use the weighted-average exchange rate from both 
the current-period and the prior-period to approximate the year-over-year effect of foreign 
currency fluctuations on revenue growth.1 
 My initial sample consists of 53,956 firm-quarters from mid-2002 through 2015 for 
which required variables are not missing. I then retain 6,946 firm-quarters where the absolute 
value of FXImpact is greater than or equal to 5 percent. I do this to avoid the miscategorization 
of headwind and tailwind observations, to create a more manageable sample for hand collection, 
and to focus on the tails of the distribution where I expect strategic disclosure to be more 
prevalent. Finally, I take a random sample of 1,000 firm-quarters to use for data collection. Of 
 
1 When compared with the disclosed effect of foreign currency fluctuations, FXImpact appears to be a suitable 
proxy. The mean (median) percentage difference between the two variables is 4.5% (1.4%). Additionally, the two 
variables are highly correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.98 (p-value < .0001). See section 3.1 for 
additional information. 
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these, I am unable to find earnings announcements for 57, resulting in a final sample of 943 firm-
quarters. 
Using logistic regression, I regress the disclosure of constant-currency growth rates on a 
categorical variable created from my proxy, FXImpact. I find that when a company has a 
currency headwind, it is 146 percent more likely to disclose constant-currency revenue growth 
rates. These results are consistent with the argument that, due to the costs that investors incur 
when extracting information about the effects of currency fluctuations on GAAP revenue growth 
rates, managers are motivated to make strategic disclosures that provide the highest possible 
growth rate. In subsequent tests, I find some evidence suggesting that the extent of strategic 
disclosure is increasing in the magnitude of the currency impact on revenue. 
Next, I perform cross-sectional tests to investigate the effects of the information 
environment on the strategic disclosure implied by my main results. I focus on firm size, 
institutional ownership, and analyst following as proxies for the strength of the information 
environment because these characteristics have been shown to influence company disclosure 
choices. The results provide some evidence suggesting that the extent of strategic disclosure is 
lower among firms with strong information environments. 
In addition, I provide robustness tests using a sample of headwind-tailwind pairs. For 
each pair I require that both observations are from the same firm, and that the tailwind 
observation occurs within four quarters before or after the headwind observation. This results in 
a sample of 673 pairs. I also create a subset of this sample that consists of only pairs for which 
the tailwind occurs after the headwind. This sample has 299 pairs. I find that nearly 90 percent of 
the headwind-tailwind pairs are consistent in disclosure choice between the two quarters. 
However, of the pairs where disclosure is inconsistent, approximately 75 percent are 
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opportunistic in their disclosure choice (i.e., they only disclose when facing a currency 
headwind). Using McNemar’s Test of marginal homogeneity, I find strong statistical evidence 
supporting my hypothesis that firms are more likely to disclose constant-currency revenue 
growth rates when there is a currency headwind. Finally, I use the same logistic regressions from 
my main sample to test both paired samples and find results that are consistent with my main 
hypothesis that firms with currency headwinds are more likely to disclose constant-currency 
revenue growth rates. 
My paper makes several contributions. First, I contribute to the ongoing discussion 
surrounding non-GAAP performance metrics. As previously discussed, while regulators at the 
SEC and the FASB support non-GAAP reporting, they are concerned that non-GAAP figures are 
frequently computed or reported in a misleading manner. In an effort to combat this, the SEC has 
revised non-GAAP guidelines and the FASB is considering disaggregating the income statement, 
which would essentially standardize several non-GAAP metrics. My findings provide support for 
these efforts since I examine a previously unexplored non-GAAP figure and provide evidence 
suggesting that managers disclose it strategically. In particular, I expect my findings will be of 
interest to standard setters as they consider which income statement line items should be 
disaggregated and how they should be disaggregated. 
I also contribute to prior research on non-GAAP reporting by being the first to examine 
the reporting of non-GAAP revenue metrics. While there is a robust literature surrounding non-
GAAP reporting, it centers around the reporting of non-GAAP earnings metrics. Thus, my paper 
is the first to document the common reporting of non-GAAP revenue metrics, and that managers 
are likely to make these disclosures strategically. My study therefore enhances our understanding 
of the use of non-GAAP metrics and the motivations behind their use.  
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My paper also contributes to the geographic segment reporting literature. Prior literature 
examines the effects of changes in reporting requirements, and how geographic disclosures affect 
forecasts and valuation. However, my paper demonstrates that geographic segment disclosures 
are also useful for estimating constant-currency revenue growth rates and for detecting managers 
who opportunistically disclose non-GAAP figures. Thus, I provide additional support for strong 
segment reporting requirements by documenting additional benefits of geographic 
disaggregation to financial statement users. 
Finally, my findings should be of interest to investors and regulators because they 
highlight that manipulation can occur when non-GAAP metrics are not disclosed. While much of 
the concern surrounding non-GAAP reporting is fixated on the potential manipulation within 
disclosed non-GAAP metrics, the strategic withholding of non-GAAP metrics (as managers are 
incentivized to do when they benefit from a currency tailwind) can also be problematic. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior literature and 
develops my hypotheses. Section 3 describes variable measurement, my sample, and research 
design. Section 4 provides the main results. Section 5 provides the results of the paired sample 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Non-GAAP Reporting 
Under the SEC’s Regulation G, which was implemented in 2003 as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, non-GAAP reporting is permitted, within limits. As non-GAAP reporting has 
continued to proliferate in the U.S. (Black et al. [2018b]), the SEC issued Compliance and 
Disclosure Interpretations (C&DI) on non-GAAP reporting in 2010 and 2016 to address 
questions regarding Regulation G. These C&DIs reflect increased concern among regulators at 
both the SEC and the FASB that non-GAAP metric reporting by public companies is gaining 
greater prominence than GAAP metrics, and that the non-GAAP figures can be misleading 
(Leone [2010], Rapoport [2013], Teitelbaum [2015], Bricker [2016], Michaels and Rapoport 
[2016], Rapoport [2016], Schnurr [2016], White [2016], Golden [2017]). Specifically, SEC 
Chair Mary Jo White identified “lack of consistency” and “cherry-picking” as “troublesome 
practices which can make non-GAAP disclosures misleading” (White [2016]). 
At the same time, regulators see value in non-GAAP reporting. FASB board member 
Marc Siegel describes the combination of non-GAAP metrics with audited financial statements 
as “a powerful analytical tool in understanding the underlying business” (Siegel [2014]). SEC 
Chair White recently highlighted that companies are required to “tell their own stories in their 
MD&A” and that non-GAAP measures help financial statement users see that story (White 
[2016]). Similarly, FASB Chair Russell Golden has stated that investors often request and shape 
non-GAAP reporting (Golden [2017]). Golden also mentioned that increased non-GAAP 
disclosure might be a sign to the FASB that GAAP could be improved. Consistent with this, the 
FASB is considering disaggregating the income statement by requiring more subtotals. Such a 
change would essentially standardize some non-GAAP metrics. However, in order to do so it is 
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important for the FASB to “study non-GAAP measures that are used in practice” (Golden 
[2017]). In a recent presentation to accounting academics, SEC Chief Accountant Wesley 
Bricker suggested that non-GAAP measures should be a topic “for continued emphasis in 
accounting research”, with a particular interest in the determinants of non-GAAP reporting 
(Bricker [2017]) 
The non-GAAP literature has attempted to answer whether non-GAAP reporting is 
motivated by informativeness or opportunism (Black et al. [2018b]), with several early papers 
supporting the motivation of improved information. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that non-
GAAP earnings are more persistent than GAAP earnings, and several studies find that non-
GAAP earnings are more value relevant (Bradshaw and Sloan [2002], Brown and Sivakumar 
[2003], Frankel and Roychowdhury [2005]). More recently, Curtis et al. (2014) examine the 
motivation to disclose transitory gains and find that, despite the income-decreasing nature of the 
non-GAAP adjustment, the most pervasive reason to provide the disclosure is to inform financial 
statement users. Black et al. (2018a) examine non-GAAP reporting and find that when firms 
change non-GAAP calculations, it is generally to improve informativeness. 
However, several studies have found opportunism to be a significant source of the 
motivation for non-GAAP reporting. Black and Christensen (2009) examine whether managers 
use non-GAAP earnings to meet earnings targets. The authors find that managers often exclude 
recurring charges, such as stock compensation, depreciation, and research and development, to 
meet earnings targets. Additionally, they find that sporadic non-GAAP reporting firms are more 
likely to use non-GAAP reporting to meet targets. Doyle et al. (2013) find similar results, and 
also show that managers use non-GAAP reporting as a substitute for accruals earnings 
management when the latter is more costly. While Curtis et al. (2014) find that the majority of 
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non-GAAP disclosers do so to improve the information available to investors, the authors also 
show that a significant number of firms in their sample only disclose non-GAAP metrics 
opportunistically. Collectively, prior literature suggests that both motivations contribute to the 
observed disclosure of non-GAAP metrics. 
To date, the non-GAAP literature has focused exclusively on non-GAAP earnings 
measures, despite several studies that show that revenue is value relevant. Swaminathan and 
Weintrop (1991) use Value Line forecasts of both revenue and earnings to measure surprises 
around earnings announcements. The authors find that both revenue and expenses have 
incremental explanatory power beyond earnings in explaining excess returns. Similarly, Davis 
(2002) examines internet companies and finds that revenue surprises, based on analyst forecasts, 
are associated with announcement-period returns after controlling for earnings surprises. Ertimur 
et al. (2003) provide evidence that stock prices react more to a revenue surprise than an expense 
surprise, and that in some situations, revenue is more value relevant than earnings. Jegadessh and 
Livnat (2006) show that revenue surprises are associated with more persistent future earnings 
growth than earnings surprises. In addition, the authors find that revenue surprises are related to 
future earnings announcement date returns, as well as post-announcement drift. This indicates 
that the market does not fully incorporate information about future earnings when revenue 
surprises are announced. Chandra and Ro (2008) find that the value relevance of revenue is 
pervasive, rather than only relevant in extreme cases such as earnings losses. In addition, the 
authors document that the value relevance of earnings has decreased over time whereas the value 
relevance of revenue has remained stable. Taken together, this research provides an opportunity 
and motivation for documenting non-GAAP revenue disclosures and understanding the 
motivation for such disclosures. 
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2.2. Currency Exchange Rates and Constant-Currency Growth 
Under U.S. GAAP, the accounting is extremely complex for multinational firms that 
operate in foreign countries and with foreign currencies. At a high level, when a U.S. firm (a 
“reporting entity”) has a foreign entity (referred to here as a subsidiary) with a functional 
currency that differs from the functional currency of the firm, the assets, liabilities, revenues, 
expenses, gains, and losses of the subsidiary must be translated into the currency of the reporting 
entity. The exchange rate used for the translation of income statement items is the average 
exchange rate over the reporting period. When the income statements from two different time 
periods are presented together (for example, Q1 2018 and Q1 2019), each period is translated 
using the average exchange rate of the respective period. Thus, due to foreign currency 
fluctuations, the comparative performance between two periods before translation is likely to 
differ from the comparative performance after translation. 
 As an example, Company X is located in the U.S. and its functional currency is the U.S. 
dollar (USD). Company X has a foreign entity, Entity Y, from which Company X earns all its 
revenue and income. Entity Y operates in Europe and its functional currency is the Euro (EUR).2 
Entity Y has year 1 revenue of €100 and year 2 revenue of €110, an increase of 10 percent. The 
average EUR/USD exchange rate is 1.20 in year 1 and 1.10 in year 2.3 When Entity Y’s revenue 
is translated into USD for presentation in Company X’s financial statements, year 1 revenue is 
$120 and year 2 revenue is $121, an increase of only 0.8 percent. In order to highlight the pre-
translation growth, Company X may present non-GAAP growth that removes the impact of the 
 
2 This example is extreme by design (i.e., all revenue is derived from a foreign entity) so that GAAP revenue growth 
can be more easily compared to constant-currency revenue growth. 
3 When exchange rates are quoted, the base currency is stated first and followed by the quote currency. In the 
example of EUR/USD, EUR is the base currency and USD is the quote currency. If the exchange rate quote for 
EUR/USD is 1.20, it signifies that one EUR can be exchanged for 1.20 USD. 
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currency fluctuation. This is accomplished by using the exchange rate from year 1 to translate 
both years. This is known as constant-currency growth and results in revenues of $120 and $132, 
respectively, or the same 10 percent growth rate as the company had in EUR.4  
As demonstrated, constant-currency revenue growth adjusts a company’s revenue growth 
to remove the effects of foreign currency fluctuations. In periods when the dollar strengthens, the 
translation of revenue denominated in a foreign currency reduces revenue growth when 
compared to the prior year. Thus, GAAP revenue growth will be lower than constant-currency 
revenue growth. I refer to foreign currency fluctuations that cause a decrease in revenue growth 
when compared to the prior year as “currency headwinds”. This is because the change in 
exchange rates slows revenue growth. The opposite is true when the dollar weakens (i.e., GAAP 
revenue growth is higher than constant-currency revenue growth). I refer to the opposite as 
“currency tailwinds”, since the change in exchange rates accelerates revenue growth. 
To date, no studies have examined the disclosure of constant-currency revenue figures. 
Harris and Rajgopal (2018) provide some evidence through a survey of CFOs regarding how 
their firms measure, report, and manage foreign currency impacts. Of the respondents at public 
firms, 74 percent said that they provide constant-currency revenue figures when the impact from 
currency movements is greater than 5 percent. This is higher than for any other constant-
currency accounting item on the survey question, although net income is a close second at 67 
percent.5 According to the WSJ, firms have increasingly reported constant-currency revenue 
growth in periods when the dollar has strengthened (Chasan [2015]). In the article, Carol Tomé, 
the CFO of Home Depot, claims that companies strategically report constant-currency growth 
 
4 Constant-currency growth is also commonly referred to as currency-neutral growth. I use the two interchangeably. 
5 The remaining items for this question of the survey, and the percentage of respondents who responded that they 
disclose constant-currency results when currency effects are material, are operating costs (44%), operating cash flow 
(24%), liabilities (11%), and assets (10%) (Harris and Rajgopal [2018]). 
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rates. According to Tomé, when the dollar weakens and boosts revenue growth, “you rarely hear 
companies point out the benefits” (Chasan [2015]). In the same article, the WSJ notes that this 
inconsistency in the reporting of constant-currency growth rates is a major a concern to the SEC. 
Some of the CFOs who participated in the survey from Harris and Rajgopal (2018) also 
participated in interviews with the authors, some of whom made statements similar to that of 
Tomé. In particular, one CFO is quoted saying, “[I]f there was a material currency impact, we 
would call it out…. Especially if the currency impact affected revenue…. We would not talk 
about it if the impact were favorable, but that is normal for any corporation” (Harris and 
Rajgopal [2018], p. 22). Anecdotally, these sources suggest that managers of public firms 
strategically disclose non-GAAP constant-currency figures. 
2.3. The Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis and Strategic Disclosure 
Theory derived from the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) predicts that managers will 
strategically disclose constant-currency revenue growth. The EMH proposes that a market is 
efficient if security prices fully reflect all available information (Fama [1970]).6 However, 
evidence suggests that the market fails to completely price all relevant information (Sloan 
[1996], Xie [2001], Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003], Cohen and Frazzini [2008], Cohen and Lou 
[2012], Callen et al. [2013]). In an effort to reconcile the EMH with the existence of such 
anomalies, Bloomfield (2002) posits the Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis (IRH), which states 
that “statistics that are more costly to extract from public data are less completely revealed in 
market prices” (Bloomfield [2002], p. 234).7 The author explains that the process by which 
 
6 The EMH has three broad information subsets or categories: the weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong 
form. When the form is not explicitly stated, one may assume that the semi-strong form is implied, which has the 
information subset of all publicly available information (Fama [1970], Jensen [1978], Fama [1991]). In the case of 
this paper, I also intend that any reference to the EMH is a reference to the semi-strong form. 
7 Bloomfield (2002) suggests that the IRH is an extension of the EMH, not a replacement. 
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information is impounded in stock prices begins with data—“ink spots on sheets of paper, or bits 
stored in a computer file” (Bloomfield [2002], p. 234). However, data is not useful until it has 
been extracted from its source and converted into a statistic—a “useful fact”. This process 
requires resources or extraction costs, which can be the “cash costs of identifying, collecting, 
compiling, printing and processing data, or hiring others to do so” or “the cognitive difficulty of 
extracting information from data that has already been identified and collected” (Bloomfield 
[2002], p. 236). The costs required to extract facts from data vary across statistics. Hence, cost 
constraints prevent the most resource intensive statistics from being impounded in price, which 
results in EMH anomalies.8 
One implication of the IRH, as noted by the author, is that managers are motived to make 
it more difficult (costly) for investors to find information if managers do not want the 
information to impact their firm’s stock price. For example, a manager may “classify arguably 
ongoing expenses as nonrecurring or extraordinary items while reporting arguably unusual gains 
as part of operating income” or “announce pro forma earnings numbers that emphasize 
improvements relative to their own strategically chosen benchmarks, while making it more 
difficult for investors to observe other measures of performance” (Bloomfield [2000], p. 238).  
Prior literature documents such behavior. Schrand and Walther (2000) investigate 
whether prior-period gains (losses) from the sale of property, plant, and equipment are included 
(excluded) from prior-period earnings when presented as a benchmark for current-period 
earnings. The authors find that managers are more likely to separately announce prior-period 
gains, which provides the lowest possible prior-period earnings. Schrand and Walther conclude 
 
8 Other authors have suggested similar enhancements to the EMH. Jensen (1978) suggests a version of the EMH in 
which “a market is efficient with respect to information set qt if it is impossible to make economic profits by trading 
on the basis of the information set qt”, where economic profits are “returns net of all costs” (pg. 97). Fama (1991) 
describes this as an “economically more sensible version” (pg. 1575). 
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that “observed strategic disclosure decisions are consistent with a conjecture by managers that 
the nonrecurring nature of the prior-period gain/loss will be forgotten unless it is separately 
announced” (p. 151). In a controlled experiment, Krische (2005) finds that investors are affected 
by the strategic disclosure documented by Schrand and Walther (2000). The author also 
investigates the source of the effect and finds that it “is likely to be unintentional on the part of 
investors, resulting from limitations in their memory for the prior-period event” (p. 243). In 
addition, Curtis et al. (2014) find that a significant proportion of firms are opportunistic 
disclosers of transitory gains and losses.9 
In terms of foreign currency impacts, the IRH suggests that managers are likely to seek to 
boost stock prices by opportunistically disclosing constant-currency figures. The prediction of 
strategic disclosure coincides with the statements of CFOs found in Chasan (2015) and Harris 
and Rajgopal (2018). In addition, prior research generally finds that stock prices are sensitive to 
changes in foreign exchange rates (Jorion [1990], Bartov and Bodnar [1994], Bartram and 
Bodnar [2012]). This supports the idea that a manager would be concerned that knowledge about 
negative foreign currency impacts might negatively affect their firm’s stock price. Furthermore, 
Bartov and Bodnar (1994) show that investors fail to use all available information regarding 
foreign currency impacts, but that a trading strategy derived from those results earns abnormal 
returns. The authors attribute this shortcoming of investors “to the complexity of the relation 
between currency changes and firm performance, assets, and liabilities” (Bartov and Bodnar 
 
9 Additional research motivated by the IRH finds that firms with lower earnings have less readable annual reports 
(Li [2008]). The author suggests that this association is evidence of obfuscation, in an attempt to make it more 
difficult for investors to determine how poor performance is and delay the stock price impact of this information. 
However, the author and Bloomfield (2008) suggest that the association may be explained by the fact that negative 
performance can be more difficult to describe and results in more questions from investors. More recently, Bushee et 
al. (2018) compare the linguistic complexity of analyst questions on earnings conference calls to the complexity of 
management answers to determine whether complexity is evidence of obfuscation or simply a complex response to a 
complex question. The authors find that their measure of complexity is associated with information asymmetry. 
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[1994], p. 1783). Harris and Rajgopal (2018) find that the CFOs they interview share this 
sentiment, summarizing that “except at some high level… CFOs suspect that investors don’t get 
[foreign currency]” (p. 20).10 Taken together, these findings suggest that investors face high costs 
to extract and use data about foreign currency impacts, and that managers understand this.  
2.4. Geographic Segment Reporting and Estimating Macroeconomic Effects 
In spite of limited disclosure, complex accounting, and high extraction costs, Bartov and 
Bodnar (1994) demonstrate that investors have access to freely available information about 
currency impacts that can be used to generate excess returns. While the authors do not address 
estimating constant-currency revenue growth, their findings suggest that investors may be able to 
do so using the financial statements. Such estimates require geographic segment data. Public 
firms are required to disclose segment information in the 10-K annual report. These requirements 
were originally found in Statement of Financial Standards No. 14 (SFAS 14), which was 
superseded by Statement of Financial Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131) at the end of 1997. Under 
SFAS 14, firms were required to disclose both line-of-business segments and geographic 
segments, both of which presented the same level of detail, including revenues and earnings for 
each segment. In an effort to be more flexible, SFAS 131 instead requires that firms disclose 
operating segments using a “management view”. In other words, a firm’s disclosed operating 
segments should coincide with the way the firm is organized internally, such as by products and 
services, legal entity, customer type, geographic area, or another basis. Most firms continue to 
report by line-of-business (Herrmann and Thomas [2000]). SFAS 131 requires that a firm must 
also report geographic segments, unless the firm’s operating segments are already reported by 
 
10 It is not just investors who struggle with foreign currency. Harris and Rajgopal (2018) state that, due to the 
complexity of foreign currency impacts, “it is infeasible for… managers to be informed of all the exposures on an 
ongoing basis” (pgs. 37-38), and that most internal financial data users do not understand the impacts.  
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geographic area. However, SFAS 131 changes geographic segments in two ways. First, 
geographic segments are more disaggregated. Previously, geographic segments were presented 
as geographic areas, which often include several countries per area. Instead, SFAS 131 requires 
country-level disclosure for all material countries (while immaterial countries may be grouped 
together). Second, SFAS 131 no longer requires the disclosure of geographic segment earnings. 
Unless a firm voluntarily discloses geographic earnings, the only geographical earnings in 
financial statements is domestic and foreign income before income tax, as required by SEC 
Regulation §210.4-08(h), General Notes to Financial Statements—Income Tax Expense (Rule 4-
08(h)). Hence, SFAS 131 improves geographic segment disaggregation but weakens earnings 
visibility.11 
Prior literature examines the potential usefulness of geographic segment disclosure, 
typically by combining geographic segment data with macroeconomic data, such as gross 
national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP), to create geographic segment models. 
Early work examining earnings forecast predictability delivers mixed results. Using a sample of 
firms from the United Kingdom, Roberts (1989) finds that geographic segment models 
outperform the random walk. The author also documents that forecasts made using only 
geographic revenue perform as well as forecasts using geographic earnings. Conversely, 
Balakrishnan et al. (1990) examine U.S. firms and find little evidence that geographic segment 
disclosure improves earnings forecasts. However, both studies suffer from small samples. More 
recently, Li et al. (2014) examine a large, global sample and find that combining segment and 
 
11 Herrmann and Thomas (2000) find that most firms report by line-of-business after the enactment of SFAS 131. In 
addition, the authors document an increase in the proportion of country-level segments, a decrease in the proportion 
of broad geographic area segments, and a decrease in the disclosure of earnings by geographic segment. 
   18 
macroeconomic data results in superior forecasts. Additionally, a trading strategy based on their 
forecasts earns future excess stock returns. 
Further research examines the value relevance of geographic disclosures and initially find 
little evidence of an association between segment income and equity prices (Boatsman et al. 
[1993]). Similar to the forecasting studies, the sample from Boatsman et al. (1993) is relatively 
small. Rather than using segment earnings, Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) use Rule 4-08(h) 
domestic and foreign earnings disclosures and find that foreign earnings is value relevant and has 
a larger association coefficient than domestic earnings. The authors use geographic segment 
revenue growth as a proxy for growth opportunities to show that the larger association 
coefficient on foreign earnings is driven by greater growth opportunities. Bodnar and Weintrop 
(1997) suggest that their difference in results is due to their use of Rule 4-08(h), which provides 
a larger sample since materiality for disclosure is lower than with geographic segments. In 
addition, Rule 4-08(h) earnings is consistent across firms whereas SFAS 14 earnings may be any 
of a number of earnings figures, as selected by the firm. Additional studies examine the 
mispricing of foreign earnings. Thomas (1999) shows that investors underestimate the 
persistence of foreign earnings, and that this mispricing allows for the construction of a hedge 
portfolio that earns positive returns. Building on these results, Callen et al. (2005) find that 
domestic earnings contribute more to unexpected stock returns variability than foreign earnings. 
However, the difference in contribution decreases as investment by long-term institutional 
investors increases. The authors suggest that this may be evidence that sophisticated investors are 
better able to analyze public disclosures. 
Several studies investigate the effects of the implementation of SFAS 131. As discussed, 
SFAS 131 increased the disaggregation of geographic segments by requiring country-level 
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disclosure. This change increased the predictive ability of geographic sales disclosures (Behn et 
al. [2002]). Additionally, while only 26 percent of firms continue to report geographic earnings 
after the enactment of SFAS 131, Hope et al. (2008) find that the value relevance of foreign 
earnings increases, and that the mispricing of foreign earnings no longer exists. Hope et al. 
(2009) show that geographic segment disaggregation drives this increase in value relevance. The 
changes required by SFAS 131 also improve analyst forecasts. Prior research finds that analyst 
forecasts are less accurate and more optimistic as international diversification increases (Duru 
and Reeb [2002]). In addition, the serial correlation of analyst forecast errors and post-earnings-
announcement-drift based on analyst forecast errors also increase with greater international 
diversification (Kang et al. [2017]). However, Kang et al. (2017) find that both associations are 
significantly reduced after SFAS 131 becomes effective. 
While SFAS 131 improved geographic disaggregation, the loss of earnings disclosure has 
negative consequences. After SFAS 131, non-disclosing firms are more likely to overinvest in 
foreign operations (Hope and Thomas [2008]) and have lower worldwide effective tax rates 
(Hope et al. [2013]). These findings suggest that managers use non-disclosure as a tool to hide 
empire building and tax-motivated income shifting (i.e., tax-avoidance) since it is more difficult 
for investors and government officials to identify the location of earnings. In addition, non-
disclosure has real capital markets consequences. Hope et al. (2009) document lower foreign 
earnings value relevance for non-disclosing firms. Chen et al. (2018) investigate tax-motived 
income shifting and find that it is associated with an increase in several measures of information 
asymmetry. However, the result is concentrated in firms that discontinue geographic earnings 
disclosures after SFAS 131. Taken together, these results suggest that geographic earnings non-
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disclosure increases obfuscation, which incentivizes negative management behavior and 
increases the difficulty of evaluating earnings. 
As previously stated, many of the studies examining geographic segments combine 
segment and macroeconomic data to create firm-level measures of macroeconomic exposure. 
The general process consists of the following steps. First, obtain both the macroeconomic data 
and the most recent geographic segment data, which is only disclosed annually in the Form 10-
K. Second, map the segments to the macroeconomic data. Since country-level disclosure is only 
required for material countries, reported segments often combine several countries. Common 
examples of these vague, geographic segments are “South America”, “Europe, the Middle East 
and Africa”, and “Rest of World”. In such cases, a decision must be made how to allocate 
macroeconomic data to mixed-country segments. Finally, calculate each segment’s 
macroeconomic exposure, which often involves a calculation for both the current and prior-year 
quarter. This extraction process is non-trivial, but the research discussed earlier demonstrated 
that the estimates created from the data have value. Combined with the findings of Bartov and 
Bodnar (1994), it is reasonable to assume that estimates of constant-currency revenue growth can 
be generated using the same process. 
2.5. Hypothesis Development 
The discussion above suggests that managers are incentivized to strategically disclose a 
statistic when managers believe (a) when not disclosed, the statistic is costly to extract, and (b) 
disclosure of the statistic impacts stock price. That is, the IRH provides theoretical support for 
the hypothesis that managers are likely to strategically disclose the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations on revenue growth. If exchange rate fluctuations have an adverse effect on revenue 
growth (currency headwind), managers are incentivized to disclose the effect. Doing so allows a 
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manager to highlight the firm’s organic growth and shift (some) blame for poor performance to 
exchange rate fluctuations. 12 Conversely, if exchange rate fluctuations have a positive effect on 
revenue growth (currency tailwind), managers are incentivized to withhold disclosure and 
attribute the positive performance to their own actions. Hence, I predict that managers will 
strategically disclose constant-currency growth rates. The preceding arguments form the basis for 
my first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H1. Companies with currency headwinds are more likely to disclose constant-currency 
revenue growth rates. 
I also expect that, as the size of currency headwinds increase, the likelihood of strategic 
disclosure will increase. Thus, my second hypothesis (stated in the alternative form) is as 
follows: 
H2. The positive association between currency headwinds and the disclosure of constant-
currency revenue growth rates is increasing in the magnitude of the currency headwind. 
2.5.1. The Effect of Information Environment on Disclosure 
Prior research suggests that companies with strong information environments may be less 
likely to make strategic disclosures. I focus my investigation on three factors that are associated 
with information environment: company size, sell-side analyst following, and institutional 
investor ownership. Prior research finds that company size is associated with both disclosure and 
tone of disclosure (Buzby [1975], Li [2010]). Litigation is a major factor as “larger firms expect 
 
12 Exchange rates are difficult to predict. The early work of Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b) suggests that the best 
predictor is a random walk without drift. Rossi (2013) empirically analyses the ensuing exchange rate forecasting 
methods that have been proposed in the literature and finds that none of the predictors have strong out-of-sample 
predictability. The author concludes that there is no convincing evidence to overturn the theory that a random walk 
without drift is the best exchange rate predictor. In other words, “the best predictor of exchange rates tomorrow is 
the exchange rate today” (p. 1090). This implies that the negative (and positive) impact from exchange rates that a 
firm might face are not necessarily the result of poor forecasting on the part of management; both the firm’s 
managers and its investors should predict unchanged exchange rates. Thus, it is reasonable for a manger to disclose 
exchange rate effects in an effort to avoid attribution for their impact. 
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to be sued more frequently” (Core [2001], p. 449), and Skinner (1997) finds that pre-disclosure 
lowers the conditional costs of lawsuits. In a study of the tone of forward-looking statements in 
10-Q and 10-K MD&A, Li (2010) finds that larger firms have a more negative tone. The author 
suggests that this supports “the hypothesis that large firms are more cautious in their disclosure 
due to political and legal concerns” (Li [2010], p. 1070-1071). In addition, prior research 
suggests that the monitoring aspect of analyst following and institutional investor ownership may 
affect company disclosure choices and management behavior (Lang and Lundholm [1996], 
Bushee [1998], El-Gazzar [1998], Bushee and Noe [2000], Roulstone [2003], Ajinkya et al. 
[2005], Files et al. [2009]). This is, in part, because analysts and institutional investors are 
regarded as better processors of information, allowing data to be more thoroughly extracted into 
statistics. 
The increase in litigation risk and the decrease in costs of information acquisition from 
these various factors lead me to expect that the strategic disclosure of constant-currency growth 
rates will decrease as the strength of the information environment increases. While my first 
hypothesis suggests that strategic disclosure will be evidenced by more disclosure of constant-
currency revenue growth rates for companies with currency headwinds relative to currency 
tailwinds, the preceding discussion suggests that disclosure behavior should be less sensitive to 
currency fluctuations for companies with a strong information environment. My prediction about 
the association between the strategic disclosure of constant-currency growth rates and the 
strength of the information environment is summarized in the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative: 
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H3. The positive association between currency headwinds and the disclosure of constant-
currency revenue growth rates is decreasing in the strength of the information 
environment. 
3. Variable Measurement, Research Design, and Sample Selection 
3.1. Variable Measurement 
To test my hypothesis that currency headwinds are associated with the disclosure of 
constant-currency revenue growth rates, I create a proxy for the effect of exchange rate 
fluctuations on revenue growth (a proxy variable is necessary because the variable is only 
available when disclosed).13 My proxy FXImpact, is created with the following steps. First, I 
obtain a list of all unique geographic segment names from Compustat. I manually match segment 
names to currencies when the segment name can be tied to a specific currency. For instance, I 
match “Germany” to the Euro and “China” to the Renminbi, while “South America” has no 
match since there is no single currency for South America. For the segments that have no match, 
I use the Wall Street Journal Dollar Index (BUXX). BUXX is an index of the U.S. dollar relative 
to a weighted basket of foreign currencies. The weighting is based on the results of a triennial 
foreign exchange survey published by the Bank for International Settlements. It includes 16 
foreign currencies that, as of the 2013 survey, account for 80% of the trading in foreign exchange 
markets.14 After I match every geographic segment to either a currency or BUXX, I compute the 
average exchange rate for every firm-quarter-segment, as well as the year-prior firm-quarter-
 
13 In my sample, 25% of the earnings announcements include a constant-currency revenue growth rate. An 
additional 10% of the earnings announcements include information that allows for the calculation of a constant-
currency revenue growth rate (e.g., “Currency negatively impacted revenue by $10 million.”) 
14 Jorion (1990) and Bartov and Bodnar (1994) both examine the value-relevance of exchange rates and calculate 
changes in exchange rates using a similar trade-weighted exchange rate. Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) use the same 
method in their study of the valuation of foreign income. I improve upon the method by only using a trade-weighted 
exchange rate (BUXX) when segments are not currency-specific. My method is similar to other studies that combine 
geographic segments and macroeconomic data (Roberts [1989], Balakrishnan et al. [1990], Behn et al. [2002], Li et 
al. [2014]). 
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segment. I then calculate the quarter-over-quarter percent change for each segment and take the 
average of the segments in each firm-quarter, weighted by segment revenue. The resulting value 
is my proxy, FXImpact.15  
My proxy is likely to differ from the actual value for at least three reasons. First, 
geographic segment revenue data is only available in the 10-K, which causes imprecise segment 
weights since quarterly segment revenue is unobservable. Second, the use of BUXX for 
ambiguous geographic segments means that the average exchange rates for those segments will 
not be accurate.16 Lastly, firms may have hedges that offset the effect of foreign exchange 
changes. However, this is not likely to be a major concern. While many firms hedge currency 
risk, several studies find that the amount offset is relatively small (Bodnar et al. [1998], 
Allayannis and Ofek [2001], Guay and Korthari [2003], Bartram et al [2010], Huang et al. 
[2019]). For example, Huang et al. (2019) find that the mean (median) percentage of foreign 
sales hedged is only 10.4 percent (0 percent). In addition, when firms hedge currency exposure, 
the vast majority hedge cash flows (i.e., payables and receivables) rather than translations of 
reported figures, such as revenue (Harris and Rajgopal [2018]).17  
 Because of the potential for error in my proxy, I perform a number of validation tests and 
compare FXImpact to the 329 reported values from my hand-collected sample. The mean 
(median) difference between reported impact and FXImpact is 0.3% (0.2%) while the mean 
 
15 See Appendix A for examples of how FXImpact is calculated. 
16 The mean (median) percent of total revenue from foreign segments is 61% (59%) while the percent of total 
foreign revenue from segments where BUXX is used is 69% (78%). I do not find a significant difference between 
headwind and tailwind observations. For observations that disclose a constant-currency revenue growth rate, I find 
that the mean percent of total revenue from foreign segments is lower than for firms that do not disclose (57% 
versus 62%, respectively), while the mean percent of total foreign revenue from segments where BUXX is used is 
higher than for firms that do not disclose (75% versus 67%, respectively). However, I fail to find a statistical 
difference between disclosing and non-disclosing firms for the percentage of total revenue where BUXX is used. 
See the discussion in Section 4.1 and Table 3 for additional details. 
17 See also Gay and Nam (1998) and Huang et al. (2019). 
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(median) percentage difference is 4.5% (10.4%). The two variables are highly correlated, with a 
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.98 (p-value < .0001). Further, regressing the reported impact 
on FXImpact results in a coefficient of 1.03 (p-value < .0001) and an adjusted R-squared of 0.96. 
Taken together, these tests indicate that FXImpact is a suitable proxy for the actual impact of 
currency fluctuations. 
3.2. Research Design 
My primary interest is in whether companies strategically disclose constant-currency revenue 
growth rates. To test my hypothesis, I develop the following model based on Li (2010): 
Disclosei,t = b0 + b1Headwindi,t + b2DQi,t + b3Earni,t + b4Reti,t + b5CFRatioi,t 
 + b6ACCi,t + b7Sizei,t + b8MTBi,t + b9RetVoli,t + b10EarnVoli,t  
 + b11NBSegi,t + b12NGSegi,t + b13Agei,t + b14MAi,t + b15SEOi,t + b16SIi,t 
+ b17BigNi,t + b18Analysti,t + b19Investi,t + b20Q2 + b21Q3 + b22Q4  
 + e (1) 
 
where: 
Disclosei,t: one of two indicator variables, Disc or DiscNumeric, that measure the 
disclosure of information about the effect of foreign currency 
fluctuations on revenue; 
Headwindi,t: an indicator variable equal to one if FXImpact is negative, and zero 
otherwise; 
DQi,t: disaggregation quality, a measure of the disaggregation of accounting 
data in the balance sheet and income statement, as measured by Chen et 
al. (2015); 
Earni,t: quarterly earnings scaled by the book value of assets, winsorized at -3 
and 3; 
Reti,t: contemporaneous stock returns in the fiscal quarter, calculated using 
CRSP monthly return data; 
CFRatioi,t: quarterly cash flow from operations (for the three months ended in the 
current quarter) scaled by the book value of current liabilities; 
ACCi,t: quarterly earnings minus cash flow from operations (for the three 
months ended in the current quarter) scaled by the book value of assets; 
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Sizei,t: the logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the quarter; 
MTBi,t: the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities, scaled 
by the book value of total assets; 
RetVoli,t: stock return volatility calculated using 12 months of monthly return data 
before the fiscal quarter ending date; 
EarnVoli,t: the standard deviation of earnings (scaled by book value of assets) 
calculated using data from the last five years, with at least three years of 
data required;  
NBSegi,t: the logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments; 
NGSegi,t: the logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments; 
Agei,t: the number of years since a firm appears in CRSP's monthly file; 
MAi,t: an indicator variable equal to one if a firm makes a merger or acquisition 
in a given fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise, calculated using data from 
SDC Platinum; 
SEOi,t: an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a seasoned equity offering 
in a fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise, calculated using data from SDC 
Platinum; 
SIi,t: the amount of special items reported for the quarter, scaled by the book 
value of assets; 
BigNi,t: an indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a Big N auditor, and zero 
otherwise; 
Analysti,t: the number of analysts in the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast prior to the 
earnings announcement; 
Investi,t: the proportion of outstanding shares that are held by institutional 
investors in the quarterly reporting period; 
Q2 (Q3 or Q4): an indicator variable equal to one if the current reporting quarter is the 
second (third or fourth) fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise; and 
i and t firm and year-quarter indicators, respectively. 
Disc is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm discloses a constant-currency growth 
rate in their earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. Some earnings announcements do not 
disclose an explicit constant-currency growth rate, but instead disclose information that allows 
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the calculation of a constant-currency growth rate (e.g., “Exchange rate fluctuations decreased 
revenue by $10 million.”) Because the latter disclosure method requires more resources to 
process the data into a statistic, I make a distinction between the two methods and only set Disc 
equal to one when an explicit growth rate is disclosed. However, I create a second Disclose 
indicator variable, DiscNumeric, which is set equal to one if a firm discloses either a constant-
currency revenue growth rate or provides information that allows for the calculation of a 
constant-currency revenue growth rate. 
In this model, Headwind is the variable of interest. My first hypothesis predicts a positive 
coefficient on Headwind, indicating that a company with a currency headwind is more likely to 
disclose constant-currency revenue growth rates than a company with a currency tailwind. In 
estimating the regression specified in Model (1), I follow Li (2010) and include several variables 
that control for a variety of firm-specific factors that may be associated with the disclosure of 
constant-currency revenue growth rates. In addition, I include disaggregation quality, DQ, as a 
measure of disclosure quality because prior work links higher levels of disaggregated disclosures 
to disclosure quality (Chen et al. [2015]). I include fiscal quarter indicators because managers 
face fewer financial reporting constraints in interim quarters, which leads to greater stock market 
reactions to bad news (Mendenhall and Nichols [1988]). Thus, I expect disclosure of currency-
neutral growth rates to be higher in the interim quarters than in the fourth quarter. 
 I exclude year fixed effects due to the strong relationship between my variable of interest, 
Headwind, and year. In eight out of the fourteen years in my sample, all of the observations 
within each year have the same value for Headwind.18 This is expected because foreign 
 
18 I perform robustness tests in section 4.3 and find no time effects that affect the disclosure of constant-currency 
revenue growth rates. 
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currencies often move against the dollar in the same direction. I estimate Model (1) using logistic 
regression with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
I estimate the following model to determine whether the probability of disclosing 
constant-currency revenue growth rates for companies with a currency headwind increases as the 
magnitude of FXImpact increases: 
Disclosei,t = b0 + b1Headwindi,t + b2Magnitudei,t + b3Headwindi,t × Magnitudei,t  
 + Controls + e (2) 
 
where: 
Magnitudei,t: the absolute value of FXImpact; and 
all other variables as previously defined. In Model (2), the variable of interest is Headwindi,t × 
Magnitudei,t. H2 predicts that the coefficient on Headwindi,t × Magnitudei,t should be positive 
and significant. A positive and significant coefficient would indicate that the likelihood of 
strategic disclosure increases with the magnitude of the currency headwind. 
Finally, H3 predicts that the strategic disclosure of constant-currency growth rates will be 
influenced by differences in the strength of the information environment. To investigate H3, I 
modify Model (1) as follows: 
Disclosei,t = b0 + b1Headwindi,t + b2Environmenti,t + b3Headwindi,t × Environment  
 + Controlsi,t + e (3) 
 
where: 
Environmenti,t: one of three measures of information environment: Size, Analyst, or 
Invest; and 
all other variables as previously defined. All three of the information environment variables, 
Size, Analyst, and Invest, are included as control variables in my prior models. When one of 
those variables takes the place of Environment in Model (3), that variable is omitted from the set 
of controls for the model. H3 predicts that b3 will be negative and significant.  
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3.3. Sample Selection 
My initial sample consists of 53,956 firm-quarters from mid-2002 through 2015. To 
calculate FXImpact, I require exchange rate information for the year-prior quarter for each 
observation. Because the BUXX index is only available beginning June 6, 2001, I require that 
the year-prior quarter for each observation begin on or after June 6, 2001. I obtain firm 
fundamental data from Compustat, analyst following data from I/B/E/S, stock price data from 
CRSP, currency exchange rates from OANDA, ownership data from Thomson Reuters, BUXX 
index values from The Wall Street Journal19, and I hand-collect constant-currency disclosures 
from 8-K filings on EDGAR. My initial sample is restricted to observations where data is 
available to create my variables and where the year-prior 10-K has both a segment that is 
specifically identified as the United States and at least one other geographic segment. I require a 
specifically identifiable United States segment so that, when creating FXImpact, I do not apply 
the BUXX index to a segment that may include the United States. 
After creating my initial sample, I limit the sample to observations where the absolute 
value of FXImpact is greater than or equal to 5 percent. I do this for three reasons. First, while 
my analysis shows that FXImpact is a good proxy for the actual currency impact, it is not perfect, 
and observations where FXImpact is close to 0 percent are more likely to be miscategorized as 
having positive (negative) currency fluctuations when the actual currency impact is negative 
(positive). Second, limiting the sample to large currency fluctuations facilitates the hand 
collection of disclosure data. Third, I focus on the tails of the FXImpact distribution because I 
expect that strategic disclosure will be more prevalent when FXImpact is large. The 5 percent 
FXImpact limit results in a sample of 6,946 firm-quarters. Finally, to better facilitate the hand  
collection of constant-currency disclosures, I take a random sample of 1,000 firm-quarters. Of 
 
19 See https://quotes.wsj.com/index/XX/CALCULATED/BUXX/historical-prices for historical BUXX figures. 
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Table 1 
Sample reconciliation 
This table provides the sample reconciliation. Because BUXX is available beginning June 6, 
2001, and I require data from the year-prior quarter, my sample period begins in mid-2002. I 
initially identify all firm-quarter observations from mid-2002 - 2015 with sufficient data in the 
Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and Thomson Reuters databases to estimate the dependent and 
control variables in my models. I exclude observations for which the absolute value of 
FXImpact, my proxy for the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on revenue growth, is less than 5 
percent. I then randomly select 1,000 firm-quarters for hand collection from the remaining 
observations. Because I am unable to find earnings announcements for 57 of the randomly 
selected observations, my final sample consists of 943 firm-quarter observations representing 
519 unique firms.  
 
  Observations 
  
Initial sample with required variables (mid-2002 - 2015) 53,956 
  
Absolute value of FXImpact < 5% 47,010 
Observations considered for hand collection 6,946 
  
Random sample for hand collection 1,000 
  
Missing earnings announcement 57 
Final sample 943 
 
these, I am unable to find earnings announcements for 57 firm-quarters, resulting in a final 
sample of 943 firm-quarters. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for my sample observations. 24.6 percent 
of observations disclose constant-currency revenue growth rates (Disc), and 34.9 percent of 
observations disclose either constant-currency revenue growth rates or information that allows 
for the calculation of constant-currency revenue growth rates (DiscNumeric). 35.2% of the 
observations are classified as having a currency headwind. The mean (median) absolute value of 
FXImpact (Magnitude) is 7.2% (6.6%). The mean (median) market value of equity (Size) is  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample observations. Panel A presents basic 
descriptive statistics. Panel B presents descriptive statistics stratified by headwind and tailwind. 
The paired t-test compares the mean of the variables using Welch's t-test. The sample is 
constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: Basic descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
              
Disc 943 0.246 0.431 0 0 0 
DiscNumeric 943 0.349 0.477 0 0 1 
Headwind 943 0.352 0.478 0 0 1 
Magnitude 943 0.072 0.022 0.057 0.066 0.081 
ForeignToTotal 943 0.608 0.164 0.481 0.595 0.714 
BUXXToTotal 943 0.407 0.208 0.255 0.408 0.544 
BUXXToForeign 943 0.693 0.319 0.436 0.780 1.000 
Control Variables             
DQ 943 0.607 0.063 0.563 0.611 0.652 
Earn 943 0.006 0.041 -0.001 0.011 0.025 
Ret 943 0.029 0.277 -0.117 0.009 0.138 
CFRatio 943 0.126 0.265 0.024 0.109 0.225 
ACC 943 -0.017 0.050 -0.029 -0.012 0.001 
Size 943 1,333.0  7.4  341.4  1,212.9  4,993.8  
MTB 943 2.028 1.420 1.204 1.588 2.336 
RetVol 943 0.123 0.070 0.075 0.107 0.153 
EarnVol 943 0.034 0.075 0.007 0.014 0.033 
NBSeg 943 3.628  1.665  2  4  5  
NGSeg 943 5.608  1.470  4  6  7  
Age 943 23.324 18.941 10.167 17.504 30.501 
MA 943 0.224 0.417 0 0 0 
SEO 943 0.007 0.086 0 0 0 
SI 943 -0.005 0.032 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
BigN 943 0.883 0.321 1 1 1 
Analyst 943 5.633 7.626 0 2 9 
Invest 943 0.690 0.260 0.573 0.752 0.865 
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Table 2 (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics comparing headwinds and tailwinds 
 
  Headwinds   Tailwinds Paired t-test 
  (n = 332)   (n = 611) (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
              
Disc 0.340 0   0.195 0 0.000*** 
DiscNumeric 0.437 0   0.301 0 0.000*** 
Headwind 1.000 1   0.000 0 0.000*** 
Magnitude 0.073 0.066   0.072 0.066 0.281 
ForeignToTotal 0.601 0.578   0.612 0.606 0.353 
BUXXToTotal 0.410 0.401   0.406 0.409 0.766 
BUXXToForeign 0.696 0.781   0.692 0.777 0.853 
Control Variables             
DQ 0.618 0.625   0.601 0.606 0.000*** 
Earn 0.000 0.010   0.010 0.012 0.002*** 
Ret 0.008 -0.010   0.041 0.021 0.108 
CFRatio 0.121 0.104   0.129 0.112 0.705 
ACC -0.021 -0.013   -0.015 -0.011 0.061* 
Size 1,430.8  1,275.4    1,281.8  1,163.3  0.425 
MTB 2.064 1.545   2.008 1.609 0.581 
RetVol 0.122 0.104   0.125 0.107 0.546 
EarnVol 0.030 0.013   0.036 0.015 0.208 
NBSeg 3.773 4   3.550 4 0.077* 
NGSeg 5.607 6   5.607 6 0.999 
Age 24.374 19.459   22.754 16.589 0.206 
MA 0.235 0   0.218 0 0.547 
SEO 0.012 0   0.005 0 0.282 
SI -0.006 0.000   -0.005 0.000 0.606 
BigN 0.852 1   0.900 1 0.038** 
Analyst 5.581 2.000   5.661 2.000 0.878 
Invest 0.675 0.739   0.698 0.766 0.194 
 
$1.333 billion ($1.213 billion). The mean (median) number of business segments (NBSegs) is 2.6 
(3.0), while the number of geographic segments (NGSeg) is 4.6 (5.0). Mergers or acquisitions 
during the quarter (MA) are common (22.4%) while seasoned equity offerings (SEO) are rare 
(0.7%). Most observations have a Big N auditor (88.3%). The mean (median) number of analysts 
following is 5.6 (2.0). Finally, institutional investor ownership is high, with mean (median) 
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shareholdings of 69.0% (75.2%). Overall, my observations are larger, more diverse in business 
and geographic segments, have higher analyst following and higher institutional investor 
ownership when compared to the samples in most prior research (Li [2010]). This is likely due to 
my requirement that my observations have at least one non-U.S. geographic segment, which 
excludes many smaller public companies. 
Table 2, Panel B presents mean and median descriptive statistics stratified by headwind. I 
find that Disc and DiscNumeric are both significantly larger for headwind observations.20 
Overall, the headwind and tailwind observations in my sample are relatively similar. However, I 
find that headwind observations have higher disaggregation quality (DQ), lower earnings (Earn), 
lower accruals (ACC), and higher number of business segments (NBSeg). In addition, headwind 
observations are less likely to have a Big N auditor (BigN). 
Table 3 presents the mean and median for the variables ForeignToTotal, BUXXToTotal, 
and BUXXToForeign,21 stratified by the direction of the impact of currency fluctuations 
(Headwind or Tailwind) as well as the disclosure of a constant-currency growth rate (Informative 
or Opaque). I include this table in order to determine if there is any relationship between the use 
of BUXX (i.e., the amount of revenue from broad geographic areas) and either (a) the direction 
of currency fluctuations or (b) the choice to disclose constant-currency revenue growth. I 
compare the mean of the variables using Welch's t-test. 
In Panel A, the mean of the variables is compared between Headwind and Tailwind 
observations for (a) the entire sample, (b) only Informative (Disclose) observations, and (c) only 
Opaque observations. I fail to find a statistical difference between headwind and tailwind  
 
 
20 I compare sample means using Welch’s unequal variances t-test. 
21 See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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Table 3 
Stratified comparisons of BUXX and foreign revenue variables 
This table presents the mean and median for the variables ForeignToTotal, BUXXToTotal, and 
BUXXToForeign, stratified by the direction of the impact of currency fluctuations (Headwind or 
Tailwind) as well as the disclosure of a constant-currency growth rate (Informative or Opaque). 
In Panel A, the mean of the variables is compared between Headwind and Tailwind observations 
for (a) the entire sample, (b) only Informative (Disclose) observations, and (c) only Opaque 
observations. In Panel B, the mean of the variables is compared between Informative (Disclose) 
and Opaque observations for (a) the entire sample, (b) only Headwind observations, and (c) only 
Tailwind observations. Both panels compare the mean of the variables using Welch's t-test. The 
samples are constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix B.  
 
Panel A: Comparison of headwind and tailwind observations 
 
        t-test 
  Headwinds   Tailwinds (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean        
All Observations (n = 332)  (n = 611)  
ForeignToTotal 0.601 0.578  0.612 0.606 0.353 
BUXXToTotal 0.410 0.401  0.406 0.409 0.766 
BUXXToForeign 0.696 0.781  0.692 0.777 0.853 
       
Informative (Disclose) 
Only 
(n = 113) 
 
(n = 119) 
 
ForeignToTotal 0.560 0.549  0.575 0.591 0.362 
BUXXToTotal 0.414 0.428  0.423 0.439 0.687 
BUXXToForeign 0.748 0.823  0.756 0.845 0.827 
       
Opaque Only (n = 219) (n = 492)  
ForeignToTotal 0.623 0.595  0.621 0.608 0.893 
BUXXToTotal 0.408 0.378  0.401 0.409 0.742 
BUXXToForeign 0.669 0.768  0.677 0.751 0.786 
 
  
   35 
Table 3 (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Comparison of informative (disclose) and opaque observations 
 
        t-test 
  Informative (Disclose)   Opaque (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
       
All Observations (n = 232)  (n = 711)  
ForeignToTotal 0.567 0.560  0.621 0.606 0.000*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.419 0.428  0.403 0.397 0.260 
BUXXToForeign 0.752 0.835  0.674 0.753 0.000*** 
       
Headwinds Only (n = 113)  (n = 219)  
ForeignToTotal 0.560 0.549  0.623 0.595 0.000*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.414 0.428  0.408 0.378 0.776 
BUXXToForeign 0.748 0.823  0.669 0.768 0.025** 
       
Tailwinds Only (n = 119) (n = 492)  
ForeignToTotal 0.575 0.591  0.621 0.608 0.002*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.423 0.439  0.401 0.409 0.225 
BUXXToForeign 0.756 0.845  0.677 0.751 0.005*** 
 
observations for all three variables across all three samples. This indicates that the use of BUXX 
is not a proxy for currency impacts. 
In Panel B, the mean of the variables is compared between Informative (Disclose) and 
Opaque observations for (a) the entire sample, (b) only Headwind observations, and (c) only 
Tailwind observations. Across all three samples I find that ForeignToTotal is lower and 
BUXXToForeign is higher for Informative (Disclose) observations. However, I fail to find a 
difference for BUXXToTotal. This suggests that the choice to disclose is not associated with the 
percentage of revenue derived from broad geographic areas. 
Table 4, Panel A presents the distribution of observations within the categories of 
headwind / tailwind and disclosure of the impact of currency fluctuations. In my sample, the 
disclosure rate of constant-currency revenue growth rates (Disc) is 19.5% for companies with a  
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Table 4 
Sample distribution 
This table provides the sample distribution stratified by the direction of the impact of currency 
fluctuations on revenue as well as the disclosure of a constant-currency growth rate. Panel A uses 
the variable Disc as a measure of disclosure and Panel B uses the variable DiscNumeric. 
  
Panel A: Sample distribution by disclosure variable Disc 
 
Disclose Tailwind Headwind 
   
No 492 219 
% 80.5% 66.0% 
   
Yes 119 113 
% 19.5% 34.0% 
     
Total 611 332 
 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by disclosure variable DiscNumeric 
 
Disclose Tailwind Headwind 
   
No 427 187 
% 69.9% 56.3% 
   
Yes 184 145 
% 30.1% 43.7% 
     
Total 611 332 
 
currency tailwind, and 34% for companies with a currency headwind, a difference of 14.5% (or a 
74.4% greater disclosure rate). When my measure of disclosure is DiscNumeric the disclosure 
rate for companies with currency tailwinds and headwinds is 30.1% and 43.7%, respectively, a 
difference of 13.6% (or a 45.2% greater disclosure rate). The difference in disclosure is 
significant for both Disc and DiscNumeric (p-values £ 0.01). This provides initial support for 
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H1, indicating that companies with currency headwinds are more likely to disclose constant-
currency revenue growth rates than companies with currency tailwinds. 
4.2. Empirical Results 
4.2.1. Main Tests of My Hypothesis 
Table 5 presents the results from estimating Model (1). The dependent variables are Disc 
and DiscNumeric in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. In each column, I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on Headwind (p-values £ 0.01). The coefficient magnitudes suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, companies with a currency headwind are approximately 146 percent more likely 
than companies with a currency tailwind to disclose constant-currency revenue growth rates 
(e0.899 - 1) and 101 percent more likely to disclose either constant-currency revenue growth rates 
or information that allows the calculation of constant-currency revenue growth rates (e0.697 - 1). 
In Table 6, I present the results from estimating Model (2), where Headwind is interacted 
with Magnitude, the size of FXImpact. Magnitude is split at the median in column (1), and is a 
continuous variable in column (2). In both columns, I find a positive and significant coefficient 
on the interaction between Headwind and Magnitude (p-values £ 0.01 and 0.10, respectively). 
The results suggest that the extent of strategic disclosure is increasing in the magnitude of the 
currency impact.  
4.2.2. Information Environment 
Tables 7-9 present results of my tests of H3, which investigates whether the strength of 
the information environment influences strategic disclosure. Table 7 examines company size as a 
measure of information environment. Size is split at the median in column (1), and is a 
continuous variable in column (2). In both columns, I find a positive and significant coefficient 
on Headwind (p-values £ 0.01, and 0.05, respectively), consistent with my primary results. The  
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Table 5 
The association between currency headwinds and the disclosure of constant-currency 
growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is Disclose, an 
indicator variable that measures the disclosure of information about the effect of foreign 
currency fluctuations on revenue. In column (1), the dependent variable is Disc, and is equal to 
one if a firm discloses a constant-currency revenue growth rate. In column (2), the dependent 
variable is DiscNumeric, and is equal to one if a firm discloses either a constant-currency 
revenue growth rate or provides information that allows for the calculation of a constant-
currency revenue growth rate. The sample is constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix B. p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard 
errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. p-values are two-tailed 
except for my variable of interest (italicized). ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable Disc  DiscNumeric 
                
Headwind 0.899 *** (0.000)  0.697 *** (0.000) 
DQ 0.804  (0.704)  1.762  (0.373) 
Earn 10.640 ** (0.021)  10.800 ** (0.010) 
Ret 0.144  (0.719)  0.102  (0.764) 
CFRatio -1.115 ** (0.019)  -1.223 ** (0.014) 
ACC 0.080  (0.982)  1.313  (0.685) 
Size 0.177 ** (0.038)  0.130  (0.121) 
MTB -0.033  (0.666)  -0.085  (0.270) 
RetVol -5.400 ** (0.013)  -5.880 *** (0.002) 
EarnVol -3.816  (0.335)  -7.901  (0.112) 
NBSeg 0.372  (0.150)  0.373  (0.135) 
NGSeg -0.538 ** (0.049)  -0.724 *** (0.005) 
Age 0.010  (0.102)  0.009  (0.169) 
MA -0.152  (0.475)  -0.036  (0.852) 
SEO -0.912  (0.520)  1.277  (0.198) 
SI -8.813 ** (0.022)  -8.994 ** (0.014) 
BigN 0.013  (0.976)  0.165  (0.676) 
Analyst -0.032 ** (0.032)  -0.049 *** (0.001) 
Invest 1.144 ** (0.026)  0.617  (0.174) 
Q2 -0.208  (0.246)  -0.191  (0.251) 
Q3 -0.207  (0.423)  -0.296  (0.193) 
Q4 -0.502 ** (0.025)  -0.429 ** (0.044) 
Constant -2.795 ** (0.028)  -1.425  (0.228)         
Observations 943  943 
Year FE NO  NO 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.152   0.165  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.762    0.767  
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Table 6 
The effect of the magnitude of currency headwinds on the association between currency 
headwinds and the disclosure of constant-currency growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is Disc, an 
indicator variable that measures the disclosure of constant-currency revenue growth rates. 
Magnitude is split at the median in column (1), and is a continuous variable in column (2). The 
sample is constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
B. p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. p-values are two-tailed except for my variable of 
interest (italicized). ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable Median  Continuous 
                
Headwind 0.486 ** (0.045)  -0.012  (0.985) 
Magnitude -0.136  (0.552)  -4.387  (0.403) 
Headwind × Magnitude 0.801 *** (0.009)  12.560 * (0.059) 
DQ 0.749  (0.724)  0.790  (0.710) 
Earn 10.660 ** (0.021)  10.460 ** (0.021) 
Ret 0.126  (0.746)  0.148  (0.705) 
CFRatio -1.193 *** (0.009)  -1.152 ** (0.014) 
ACC -0.088  (0.980)  -0.059  (0.986) 
Size 0.189 ** (0.029)  0.183 ** (0.033) 
MTB -0.035  (0.643)  -0.035  (0.649) 
RetVol -5.397 ** (0.014)  -5.345 ** (0.013) 
EarnVol -3.830  (0.320)  -3.764  (0.346) 
NBSeg 0.361  (0.168)  0.355  (0.171) 
NGSeg -0.544 ** (0.048)  -0.544 ** (0.045) 
Age 0.010  (0.130)  0.010  (0.113) 
MA -0.144  (0.504)  -0.138  (0.521) 
SEO -0.987  (0.482)  -1.038  (0.477) 
SI -8.688 ** (0.024)  -8.614 ** (0.025) 
BigN -0.062  (0.880)  -0.032  (0.940) 
Analyst -0.032 ** (0.035)  -0.031 ** (0.040) 
Invest 1.194 ** (0.018)  1.181 ** (0.022) 
Q2 -0.177  (0.325)  -0.197  (0.268) 
Q3 -0.195  (0.455)  -0.217  (0.405) 
Q4 -0.431 * (0.055)  -0.491 ** (0.029) 
Constant -2.728 ** (0.034)  -2.484 * (0.064) 
        
Observations 943  943 
Year FE NO  NO 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.159   0.155  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.767    0.765  
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interaction between Headwind and Size is negative in both columns, but only significant in 
column (1) (p-value £ 0.05). This provides some evidence that strategic disclosure is less likely 
among large companies.  
In Table 8 I present the results from estimating Model (3) with analyst following as the 
measure of information environment. Like Table 7, Analyst is split at the median, and is a 
continuous variable in columns (1), and (2), respectively. I find a positive and significant 
coefficient on Headwind in both columns (p-values £ 0.01). However, the results suggest that 
analyst following has no effect on strategic disclosure (p-values > 0.10). 
Table 9 presents the results of modeling institutional investor ownership as a measure of 
information environment. The coefficient on Headwind continues to be positive and significant 
(p-values £ 0.01). I find that the coefficient on Invest is positive and significant across both 
columns (p-values £ 0.05, and 0.01). The coefficient on the interaction Headwind × Invest is 
negative across both columns and significant in column (2) (p-value £ 0.01). 
Collectively, the results in Tables 7–9 provide some support for my hypothesis that the 
extent of strategic disclosure will be lower for firms with strong information environments. 
4.3. Robustness Tests 
Because I exclude year fixed effects from all models, I investigate whether there are year 
effects that that affect my prior results. In Table 10, column (1), I restrict my sample to years 
2005 through 2011. During these years, there is greater intra-year variance in Headwind, which 
allows for the inclusion of year fixed effects. The coefficient on Headwind is positive and 
significant (p-value £ 0.05), consistent with prior results. In column (2), I use the full sample and 
include the indicator variable Late instead of year fixed effects. Late is equal to one if the year is 
2010 or later, and zero otherwise. I split my sample on the year 2010 as it is roughly at the  
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Table 7 
The effect of firm size on the association between currency headwinds and the disclosure of 
constant-currency growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is Disc, an 
indicator variable that measures the disclosure of constant-currency revenue growth rates. Size is 
split at the median in column (1), and is a continuous variable in column (2). The sample is 
constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. p-values 
(in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by firm. p-values are two-tailed except for my variable of interest (italicized). ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable Median  Continuous 
                
Headwind 1.389 *** (0.000)  1.789 ** (0.021) 
Size 0.887 ** (0.010)  0.228 ** (0.015) 
Headwind × Size -0.756 ** (0.026)  -0.114  (0.117) 
DQ 0.982  (0.635)  0.843  (0.690) 
Earn 10.210 ** (0.023)  10.600 ** (0.022) 
Ret 0.219  (0.582)  0.166  (0.676) 
CFRatio -1.031 ** (0.023)  -1.113 ** (0.023) 
ACC 0.452  (0.894)  0.176  (0.960) 
MTB -0.005  (0.943)  -0.030  (0.691) 
RetVol -6.044 *** (0.008)  -5.546 ** (0.012) 
EarnVol -3.777  (0.328)  -3.876  (0.320) 
NBSeg 0.393  (0.134)  0.358  (0.163) 
NGSeg -0.535 ** (0.049)  -0.528 ** (0.052) 
Age 0.013 ** (0.033)  0.010  (0.118) 
MA -0.092  (0.666)  -0.148  (0.486) 
SEO -0.924  (0.480)  -0.874  (0.530) 
SI -9.311 ** (0.015)  -8.994 ** (0.019) 
BigN 0.121  (0.775)  0.055  (0.898) 
Analyst -0.029 ** (0.041)  -0.033 ** (0.028) 
Invest 1.211 ** (0.018)  1.190 ** (0.020) 
Q2 -0.164  (0.364)  -0.192  (0.287) 
Q3 -0.226  (0.381)  -0.179  (0.490) 
Q4 -0.501 ** (0.025)  -0.494 ** (0.028) 
Constant -2.400 * (0.068)  -3.276 ** (0.014) 
        
Observations 943  943 
Year FE NO  NO 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.158   0.154  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.768    0.764  
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Table 8 
The effect of analyst following on the association between currency headwinds and the 
disclosure of constant-currency growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is Disc, an 
indicator variable that measures the disclosure of constant-currency revenue growth rates. 
Analyst is split at the median in column (1), and is a continuous variable in column (2). The 
sample is constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
B. p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. p-values are two-tailed except for my variable of 
interest (italicized). ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable Median  Continuous 
                
Headwind 1.026 *** (0.000)  0.819 *** (0.000) 
Analyst 0.133  (0.657)  -0.038 ** (0.039) 
Headwind × Analyst -0.230  (0.255)  0.013  (0.730) 
DQ 0.745  (0.728)  0.817  (0.700) 
Earn 10.100 ** (0.026)  10.600 ** (0.022) 
Ret 0.196  (0.628)  0.133  (0.740) 
CFRatio -1.163 ** (0.021)  -1.114 ** (0.019) 
ACC -0.333  (0.921)  0.102  (0.977) 
Size 0.100  (0.214)  0.179 ** (0.037) 
MTB -0.030  (0.698)  -0.033  (0.666) 
RetVol -5.973 *** (0.007)  -5.313 ** (0.014) 
EarnVol -4.121  (0.333)  -3.830  (0.336) 
NBSeg 0.465 * (0.072)  0.374  (0.148) 
NGSeg -0.543 ** (0.048)  -0.536 ** (0.050) 
Age 0.008  (0.193)  0.011 * (0.094) 
MA -0.158  (0.458)  -0.156  (0.466) 
SEO -0.874  (0.514)  -0.896  (0.529) 
SI -8.034 ** (0.028)  -8.812 ** (0.022) 
BigN 0.021  (0.961)  0.002  (0.995) 
Invest 1.138 ** (0.028)  1.139 ** (0.026) 
Q2 -0.231  (0.198)  -0.212  (0.237) 
Q3 -0.206  (0.421)  -0.216  (0.402) 
Q4 -0.474 ** (0.030)  -0.502 ** (0.025) 
Constant -2.437 * (0.060)  -2.783 ** (0.029) 
        
Observations 943  943 
Year FE NO  NO 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.146   0.153  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.758    0.762  
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Table 9 
The effect of institutional investor ownership on the association between currency 
headwinds and the disclosure of constant-currency growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is Disc, an 
indicator variable that measures the disclosure of constant-currency revenue growth rates. Invest 
is split at the median in column (1), and is a continuous variable in column (2). The sample is 
constructed as disclosed in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. p-values 
(in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by firm. p-values are two-tailed except for my variable of interest (italicized). ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable Median  Continuous 
                
Headwind 1.148 *** (0.000)  2.477 *** (0.000) 
Invest 0.664 ** (0.017)  2.166 *** (0.002) 
Headwind × Invest -0.434  (0.117)  -2.096 *** (0.009) 
DQ 1.189  (0.575)  0.691  (0.747) 
Earn 10.500 ** (0.018)  11.390 ** (0.016) 
Ret 0.141  (0.719)  0.178  (0.648) 
CFRatio -1.118 ** (0.022)  -1.204 ** (0.034) 
ACC 0.165  (0.962)  -0.128  (0.973) 
Size 0.202 ** (0.017)  0.204 ** (0.021) 
MTB -0.043  (0.564)  -0.043  (0.578) 
RetVol -5.138 ** (0.015)  -4.984 ** (0.019) 
EarnVol -4.013  (0.323)  -3.644  (0.359) 
NBSeg 0.364  (0.158)  0.400  (0.126) 
NGSeg -0.564 ** (0.040)  -0.576 ** (0.036) 
Age 0.011 * (0.088)  0.010 * (0.099) 
MA -0.144  (0.502)  -0.169  (0.436) 
SEO -0.996  (0.519)  -1.026  (0.503) 
SI -8.675 ** (0.020)  -9.082 ** (0.018) 
BigN 0.031  (0.937)  0.018  (0.964) 
Analyst -0.033 ** (0.030)  -0.033 ** (0.029) 
Q2 -0.246  (0.172)  -0.232  (0.194) 
Q3 -0.214  (0.400)  -0.203  (0.429) 
Q4 -0.504 ** (0.024)  -0.513 ** (0.023) 
Constant -2.722 ** (0.029)  -3.730 *** (0.006) 
        
Observations 943  943 
Year FE NO  NO 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.152   0.159  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.761    0.768  
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midpoint of my sample period and it allows me to have sufficient variation in observations in 
both the early and late group. I find a positive and significant coefficient on Headwind (p-value £ 
0.01) and an insignificant coefficient on Headwind × Late (p-value > 0.10). Taken together, the 
results in Table 10 suggest that there is no time effect that affects the likelihood of the strategic 
disclosure of constant-currency growth rates. 
5. Headwind-Tailwind Paired Sample Analysis 
5.1. Introduction 
To provide additional evidence for my hypothesis, I follow Curtis et al. (2014) and 
collect additional data in the form of headwind-tailwind pairs. I begin with the same 6,946 
observations considered for hand collection from my initial sample. I then identify all headwind-
tailwind pairs from the same firm for which the tailwind observation is in the four quarters 
before or the four quarters after the headwind observation. This results in 2,168 headwind-
tailwind pairs. However, there are many headwind (tailwind) observations that pair with more 
than one tailwind (headwind) observation.22 In order to have exclusive pairs, for each headwind I 
keep only the closest tailwind. When a headwind has two tailwinds that are equally close, I keep 
the tailwind that occurs after the headwind.23 I then perform the same procedure for the tailwinds 
that match with multiple headwinds. This results in a sample of 673 headwind-tailwind pairs, 
which I refer to as the paired sample. In addition, I create a subset of this sample by keeping only 
the observations where the tailwind occurs after the headwind. This results in 299 headwind-
tailwind pairs, which I refer to as the trailing tailwind paired sample. I hand collect disclosure 
information following the same procedure as for my main sample. 
 
 
22 There are only 91 headwind-tailwind pairs where both the headwind and the tailwind have no other matches. 
23 Observing disclosure choice when a firm goes from a currency headwind to a currency tailwind is of greater 
interest. 
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Table 10 
The effect of time on the association between currency headwinds and the disclosure of 
constant-currency growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results in which the dependent variable is Disc, an 
indicator variable that measures the disclosure of constant-currency revenue growth rates. In 
column (1), the sample is restricted to observations from the years 2005 through 2011 and year 
fixed effects are included in the model. Column (2) uses the full sample and includes Late, an 
indicator variable equal to one if the year is 2010 or later. The sample is constructed as disclosed 
in Table 1 and variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. p-values (in parentheses) are 
based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. p-
values are two-tailed except for my variable of interest (italicized). ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1)   (2) 
Variable 2005-2011  Early / Late 
                
Headwind 0.796 ** (0.015)  0.957 *** (0.000) 
Late     0.126  (0.665) 
Headwind × Late     -0.171  (0.666) 
DQ -1.406  (0.608)  0.767  (0.720) 
Earn 2.603  (0.760)  10.510 ** (0.022) 
Ret 0.161  (0.767)  0.182  (0.649) 
CFRatio -1.853 * (0.055)  -1.124 ** (0.018) 
ACC -0.801  (0.856)  -0.015  (0.997) 
Size 0.192 * (0.086)  0.177 ** (0.039) 
MTB 0.162  (0.250)  -0.030  (0.694) 
RetVol -10.030 *** (0.005)  -5.557 ** (0.016) 
EarnVol 1.802  (0.690)  -3.839  (0.339) 
NBSeg 0.750 ** (0.021)  0.374  (0.146) 
NGSeg -0.512  (0.137)  -0.544 * (0.051) 
Age 0.002  (0.792)  0.010  (0.109) 
MA -0.291  (0.304)  -0.153  (0.474) 
SEO -0.249  (0.858)  -0.925  (0.509) 
SI -1.154  (0.807)  -8.678 ** (0.025) 
BigN 0.230  (0.698)  0.016  (0.970) 
Analyst -0.049 ** (0.018)  -0.033 ** (0.030) 
Invest 1.429 ** (0.025)  1.134 ** (0.030) 
Q2 0.340  (0.240)  -0.220  (0.238) 
Q3 0.085  (0.830)  -0.223  (0.410) 
Q4 -0.265  (0.433)  -0.499 ** (0.026) 
Constant -3.573  (0.115)  -2.766 ** (0.031)     
Observations 487  943 
Year FE YES  NO 
Cluster FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.146   0.152  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.756    0.763  
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5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 11, Panels A and B present descriptive statistics for the paired samples. Overall, 
both samples appear similar to my primary sample. In addition, Table 11, Panel C shows that the 
paired sample and trailing tailwind paired sample are similar. However, observations in the 
trailing tailwind paired sample have larger foreign currency impacts (Magnitude), lower percent 
of total revenue from foreign segments (ForeignToTotal), higher stock returns (Ret), higher stock 
return volatility (RetVol), and higher special items (SI). 
Finally, in Table 11, Panel D I present a comparison of the headwind and tailwind 
observations for both of the paired samples. Because each headwind is paired with a tailwind 
from the same firm, I calculate statistical significance using Student’s dependent sample t-test. 
As expected, the rate of disclosure is higher for headwind observations using both measures of 
disclosure (Disc and DiscNumeric) for both samples. I also find that the mean is statistically 
different for a majority of the control variables in both of the samples. Specifically, for both 
samples headwind observations have larger foreign currency impact (Magnitude); and lower 
earnings (Earn), stock returns (Ret), cash flow from operations (CFRatio), market value of 
equity (Size), market-to-book ratio (MTB), special items (SI), analyst coverage (Analyst), and 
institutional investors (Invest). Headwinds in the paired sample have a larger percent of revenue 
from foreign segments (ForeignToTotal), larger percent of revenue where BUXX is used 
(BUXXToTotal), lower disaggregation quality (DQ), lower accruals (ACC), higher earnings and 
stock return volatility (EarnVol and RetVol, respectively), higher firm age (Age), and lower 
mergers and acquisition activity (MA). Lastly, headwinds in the trailing tailwinds paired sample 
have a lower number of geographic segments (NGSeg), and lower firm age (Age). 
 
   47 
Table 11 
Descriptive statistics for the paired samples 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the paired samples observations. Panel A and Panel 
B present basic descriptive statistics for the paired sample and the trailing tailwinds paired 
sample, respectively. Panel C compares the mean of the variables of the two paired samples 
using Welch's t-test. Panel D provides descriptive statistics for headwinds and tailwinds for each 
of the two paired samples. The paired t-test compares the mean of the variables using Student's 
dependent sample t-test. The samples are constructed as disclosed in the text and variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: Paired sample basic descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
              
Disc 1,346 0.314 0.464 0 0 1 
DiscNumeric 1,346 0.397 0.490 0 0 1 
Headwind 1,346 0.500 0.500 0 0.5 1 
Magnitude 1,346 0.070 0.018 0.057 0.066 0.079 
ForeignToTotal 1,346 0.632 0.152 0.508 0.622 0.737 
BUXXToTotal 1,346 0.448 0.218 0.291 0.463 0.572 
BUXXToForeign 1,346 0.727 0.318 0.481 0.864 1.000 
Control Variables             
DQ 1,346 0.623 0.065 0.585 0.629 0.669 
Earn 1,346 0.002 0.054 -0.002 0.012 0.024 
Ret 1,346 -0.039 0.285 -0.206 -0.042 0.117 
CFRatio 1,346 0.140 0.284 0.024 0.119 0.228 
ACC 1,346 -0.023 0.073 -0.033 -0.014 0.000 
Size 1,346 1,300.2  7.4  309.3  1,312.9  4,709.7  
MTB 1,346 1.765 1.125 1.106 1.432 2.039 
RetVol 1,346 0.137 0.075 0.089 0.122 0.164 
EarnVol 1,346 0.027 0.039 0.007 0.014 0.030 
NBSeg 1,346 3.696  1.681  2  4  6  
NGSeg 1,346 5.513  1.470  4  5  7  
Age 1,346 24.815 19.307 11.175 18.723 36.027 
MA 1,346 0.227 0.419 0 0 0 
SEO 1,346 0.017 0.151 0 0 0 
SI 1,346 -0.010 0.060 -0.004 0.000 0.000 
BigN 1,346 0.880 0.325 1 1 1 
Analyst 1,346 5.374 7.361 0 2 8 
Invest 1,346 0.748 0.227 0.638 0.793 0.898 
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Table 11 (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Trailing tailwind paired sample basic descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
              
Disc 598 0.341 0.474 0 0 1 
DiscNumeric 598 0.423 0.494 0 0 1 
Headwind 598 0.500 0.500 0 0.5 1 
Magnitude 598 0.075 0.021 0.060 0.070 0.084 
ForeignToTotal 598 0.610 0.145 0.497 0.588 0.698 
BUXXToTotal 598 0.438 0.212 0.281 0.463 0.564 
BUXXToForeign 598 0.733 0.320 0.511 0.897 1.000 
Control Variables             
DQ 598 0.626 0.067 0.588 0.631 0.675 
Earn 598 0.005 0.050 -0.001 0.012 0.023 
Ret 598 0.010 0.254 -0.127 0.022 0.131 
CFRatio 598 0.147 0.311 0.025 0.127 0.238 
ACC 598 -0.017 0.043 -0.032 -0.016 0.001 
Size 598 1,493.8  7.4  343.8  1,479.0  5,401.8  
MTB 598 1.799 1.133 1.138 1.453 2.058 
RetVol 598 0.152 0.091 0.095 0.131 0.178 
EarnVol 598 0.027 0.040 0.007 0.015 0.029 
NBSeg 598 3.810  1.685  2  4  6  
NGSeg 598 5.445  1.464  4  5  7  
Age 598 25.695 19.767 11.679 18.767 36.277 
MA 598 0.217 0.413 0 0 0 
SEO 598 0.022 0.177 0 0 0 
SI 598 -0.005 0.017 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 
BigN 598 0.893 0.309 1 1 1 
Analyst 598 5.535 7.283 0 2 9 
Invest 598 0.746 0.213 0.644 0.790 0.891 
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Table 11 (Cont.) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics comparing the paired samples 
 
  Paired Sample   
Trailing Tailwind 
Paired Sample t-test 
  (n = 1,346)   (n = 598) (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
              
Disc 0.314 0   0.341 0 0.229 
DiscNumeric 0.397 0   0.423 0 0.289 
Headwind 0.500  0.500   0.500  0.500 1.000 
Magnitude 0.070 0.066   0.075 0.070 0.000*** 
ForeignToTotal 0.632 0.622   0.610 0.588 0.003*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.448 0.463   0.438 0.463 0.316 
BUXXToForeign 0.727 0.864   0.733 0.897 0.711 
Control Variables             
DQ 0.623 0.629   0.626 0.631 0.405 
Earn 0.002 0.012   0.005 0.012 0.213 
Ret -0.039 -0.042   0.010 0.022 0.000*** 
CFRatio 0.140 0.119   0.147 0.127 0.595 
ACC -0.023 -0.014   -0.017 -0.016 0.095* 
Size 1,299.8  1,312.9    1,493.7  1,478.8  0.158 
MTB 1.765 1.432   1.799 1.453 0.535 
RetVol 0.137 0.122   0.152 0.131 0.000*** 
EarnVol 0.027 0.014   0.027 0.015 0.949 
NBSeg 3.695  4    3.811  4  0.234 
NGSeg 5.512  5    5.447  5  0.511 
Age 24.815 18.723   25.695 18.767 0.357 
MA 0.227 0   0.217 0 0.653 
SEO 0.017 0   0.022 0 0.553 
SI -0.010 0.000   -0.005 -0.001 0.033** 
BigN 0.880 1   0.893 1 0.398 
Analyst 5.374 2   5.535 2 0.656 
Invest 0.748 0.793   0.746 0.790 0.863 
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Table 11 (Cont.) 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics comparing headwinds and tailwinds for the paired samples 
 
  Paired Sample     Trailing Tailwind Paired Sample   
  Headwinds   Tailwinds 
Paired t-
test   Headwinds   Tailwinds 
Paired t-
test 
  (n = 673)   (n = 673) (p-value)   (n = 299)   (n = 299) (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean   Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
                            
Disc 0.336 0   0.291 0 0.000***   0.365 0   0.318 0 0.016** 
DiscNumeric 0.426 0   0.368 0 0.000***   0.458 0   0.388 0 0.001*** 
Headwind 1.000 1   0.000 0 0.000***   1.000 1   0.000 0 0.000*** 
Magnitude 0.072 0.066   0.069 0.065 0.000***   0.080 0.075   0.070 0.065 0.000*** 
ForeignToTotal 0.635 0.623   0.629 0.621 0.000***   0.609 0.588   0.611 0.589 0.379 
BUXXToTotal 0.451 0.465   0.446 0.461 0.010***   0.438 0.463   0.437 0.463 0.474 
BUXXToForeign 0.728 0.863   0.726 0.865 0.441   0.734 0.897   0.732 0.897 0.178 
Control Variables                           
DQ 0.621 0.629   0.625 0.630 0.010***   0.625 0.631   0.627 0.630 0.473 
Earn -0.008 0.008   0.012 0.015 0.000***   -0.002 0.008   0.013 0.014 0.000*** 
Ret -0.099 -0.114   0.021 0.016 0.000***   -0.048 -0.078   0.068 0.057 0.000*** 
CFRatio 0.121 0.103   0.158 0.131 0.000***   0.110 0.073   0.185 0.155 0.000*** 
ACC -0.031 -0.016   -0.014 -0.013 0.000***   -0.016 -0.012   -0.019 -0.020 0.476 
Size 1,027.6  1,024.5    1,645.8  1,775.8  0.000***   1,183.2  1,089.0    1,885.6  1,990.2  0.000*** 
MTB 1.567 1.294   1.963 1.574 0.000***   1.643 1.321   1.956 1.578 0.000*** 
RetVol 0.151 0.140   0.123 0.105 0.000***   0.154 0.140   0.149 0.122 0.204 
EarnVol 0.030 0.015   0.025 0.012 0.000***   0.028 0.015   0.027 0.014 0.271 
NBSeg 3.691  4    3.702  4  0.316   3.804  4    3.815  4  0.377 
NGSeg 5.523  5    5.501  5  0.101   5.430  5    5.458  5  0.017** 
Age 24.841 18.767   24.790 18.433 0.077*   25.316 18.679   26.075 19.433 0.000*** 
MA 0.201 0   0.253 0 0.012**   0.204 0   0.231 0 0.366 
SEO 0.019 0   0.015 0 0.532   0.023 0   0.02 0 0.764 
SI -0.017 -0.001   -0.003 0.000 0.000***   -0.006 -0.001   -0.003 0.000 0.021** 
BigN 0.881 1   0.878 1 0.318   0.893 1   0.893 1 NA 
Analyst 5.260 2   5.489 2 0.007***   5.284 2   5.786 2 0.000*** 
Invest 0.733 0.777   0.763 0.811 0.000***   0.737 0.778   0.755 0.800 0.000*** 
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Table 12 presents the mean and median for the variables ForeignToTotal, BUXXToTotal, 
and BUXXToForeign, stratified by the direction of the impact of currency fluctuations on 
revenue (Headwind or Tailwind) as well as the disclosure of a constant-currency growth rate 
(Informative or Opaque). I compare the mean of the variables using Welch's t-test. I find results 
that are substantively similar to those from the main sample that are presented in Table 3 and 
discussed earlier in the paper.  
Table 12 
Stratified comparisons of BUXX and foreign revenue variables 
This table presents the mean and median for the variables ForeignToTotal, BUXXToTotal, and 
BUXXToForeign, stratified by the direction of the impact of currency fluctuations on revenue 
(Headwind or Tailwind) as well as the disclosure of a constant-currency growth rate (Informative 
or Opaque). Panels A and B present statistics for the paired sample, while Panels C and D 
present statistics for the trailing tailwind paired sample. In Panels A and C, the mean of the 
variables is compared between Headwind and Tailwind observations for (a) the entire sample, 
(b) only Informative (Disclose) observations, and (c) only Opaque observations. In Panels B and 
D, the mean of the variables is compared between Informative (Disclose) and Opaque 
observations for (a) the entire sample, (b) only Headwind observations, and (c) only Tailwind 
observations. Both panels compare the mean of the variables using Welch's t-test. The samples 
are constructed as disclosed in the text and variable definitions are provided in Appendix B.  
 
Panel A: Paired sample comparison of headwind and tailwind observations 
 
        t-test 
  Headwinds   Tailwinds (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean        
All Observations (n = 673)  (n = 673)  
ForeignToTotal 0.635 0.623  0.629 0.621 0.502 
BUXXToTotal 0.451 0.465  0.446 0.461 0.647 
BUXXToForeign 0.728 0.863  0.726 0.865 0.901 
       
Informative (Disclose) Only (n = 226)  (n = 196)  
ForeignToTotal 0.602 0.580  0.588 0.568 0.263 
BUXXToTotal 0.446 0.463  0.444 0.461 0.879 
BUXXToForeign 0.762 0.862  0.774 0.900 0.650 
       
Opaque Only (n = 447) 
 
(n = 477)  
ForeignToTotal 0.651 0.640  0.646 0.632 0.614 
BUXXToTotal 0.454 0.468  0.446 0.461 0.650 
BUXXToForeign 0.711 0.879  0.706 0.850 0.829 
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Table 12 (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Paired sample comparison of informative (disclose) and opaque observations 
 
        t-test 
  Informative (Disclose)   Opaque (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
       
All Observations (n = 422)  (n = 924)  
ForeignToTotal 0.595 0.575  0.649 0.637 0.000*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.445 0.463  0.450 0.465 0.670 
BUXXToForeign 0.768 0.878  0.709 0.862 0.001*** 
       
Headwinds Only (n = 226)  (n = 447)  
ForeignToTotal 0.602 0.580  0.651 0.640 0.000*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.446 0.463  0.454 0.468 0.645 
BUXXToForeign 0.762 0.862  0.711 0.879 0.035** 
       
Tailwinds Only (n = 196) (n = 477)  
ForeignToTotal 0.588 0.568  0.646 0.632 0.000*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.444 0.461  0.446 0.461 0.868 
BUXXToForeign 0.774 0.900  0.706 0.850 0.006*** 
 
 
Panel C: Trailing tailwind paired sample comparison of headwind and tailwind 
observations 
 
        t-test 
  Headwinds   Tailwinds (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean        
All Observations (n = 299)  (n = 299)  
ForeignToTotal 0.609 0.588  0.611 0.589 0.893 
BUXXToTotal 0.438 0.463  0.437 0.463 0.939 
BUXXToForeign 0.734 0.897  0.732 0.897 0.913 
       
Informative (Disclose) Only (n = 109)  (n = 95)  
ForeignToTotal 0.590 0.570  0.574 0.549 0.330 
BUXXToTotal 0.451 0.467  0.454 0.467 0.923 
BUXXToForeign 0.775 0.900  0.801 0.938 0.470 
       
Opaque Only (n = 190) (n = 204)  
ForeignToTotal 0.620 0.594  0.628 0.607 0.622 
BUXXToTotal 0.431 0.458  0.429 0.459 0.946 
BUXXToForeign 0.712 0.876  0.699 0.863 0.729 
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Table 12 (Cont.) 
 
Panel D: Trailing tailwind paired sample comparison of informative (disclose) and opaque 
observations 
 
        t-test 
  Informative (Disclose)   Opaque (p-value) 
Variable Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
       
All Observations (n = 204)  (n = 394)  
ForeignToTotal 0.583 0.564  0.624 0.603 0.000*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.452 0.467  0.430 0.458 0.173 
BUXXToForeign 0.787 0.935  0.705 0.865 0.001*** 
       
Headwinds Only (n = 109)  (n = 190)  
ForeignToTotal 0.590 0.570  0.620 0.594 0.063* 
BUXXToTotal 0.451 0.467  0.431 0.458 0.384 
BUXXToForeign 0.775 0.900  0.712 0.876 0.080* 
       
Tailwinds Only (n = 95) 
 
(n = 204)  
ForeignToTotal 0.574 0.549  0.628 0.607 0.001*** 
BUXXToTotal 0.454 0.467  0.429 0.459 0.287 
BUXXToForeign 0.801 0.938  0.699 0.863 0.004*** 
 
5.3. Univariate Test of Disclosure Choice in Adjacent Quarters 
I follow Curtis et al. (2014) by classifying each hand-collected pair as one of four 
classifications. Informative pairs disclose in both currency headwind and currency tailwind 
quarters. Similarly, Uninformative pairs never disclose. Opportunistic pairs disclose when they 
have currency headwinds but do not disclose when they have currency tailwinds. Lastly, 
Conservative pairs disclose when they have currency tailwinds, but do not disclose when they 
have currency headwinds. Of the four classifications, I am most interested in Opportunistic pairs. 
Table 13 presents contingency tables in which firm disclosure choice in headwind 
quarters is compared to firm disclosure choice in tailwind quarters. I use the four classifications 
explained above in the four quadrants of the tables. Panels A and C use Disc as a measure of 
disclosure, and Panels B and D use DiscNumeric as a measure of disclosure. Results for the  
    54 
Table 13 
Disclosure choice in adjacent quarters 
This table presents contingency tables in which firm disclosure choice in headwind quarters is 
compared to firm disclosure choice in tailwind quarters. I include p-values from McNemar's test 
of marginal homogeneity in paired nominal samples. p-values are based on the binomial 
distribution.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Paired sample, Disc 
 
  Headwind  
  
Informative 
(Disclose) Opaque Total 
Tailwind 
Informative 
(Disclose) 
176 20 196 
26.2% 3.0% 29.1% 
Informative Conservative   
Opaque 
50 427 477 
7.4% 63.4% 70.9% 
Opportunistic Uninformative   
 Total 226 447 673 
 33.6% 66.4% 100.0% 
     
       McNemar's test p-value: 0.000***   
 
 
Panel B: Paired sample, DiscNumeric 
 
  Headwind  
  
Informative 
(Disclose) Opaque Total 
Tailwind 
Informative 
(Disclose) 
233 15 248 
34.6% 2.2% 36.8% 
Informative Conservative   
Opaque 
54 371 425 
8.0% 55.1% 63.2% 
Opportunistic Uninformative   
 Total 287 386 673 
 42.6% 57.4% 100.0% 
     
       McNemar's test p-value: 0.000***   
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Table 13 (Cont.) 
 
Panel C: Trailing tailwind paired sample, Disc 
 
  Headwind  
  
Informative 
(Disclose) Opaque Total 
Tailwind 
Informative 
(Disclose) 
85 10 95 
28.4% 3.3% 31.8% 
Informative Conservative   
Opaque 
24 180 204 
8.0% 60.2% 68.2% 
Opportunistic Uninformative   
 Total 109 190 299 
 36.5% 63.5% 100.0% 
     
       McNemar's test p-value: 0.024**   
 
 
Panel D: Trailing tailwind paired sample, DiscNumeric 
 
  Headwind  
  
Informative 
(Disclose) Opaque Total 
Tailwind 
Informative 
(Disclose) 
108 8 116 
36.1% 2.7% 38.8% 
Informative Conservative   
Opaque 
29 154 183 
9.7% 51.5% 61.2% 
Opportunistic Uninformative   
 Total 137 162 299 
 45.8% 54.2% 100.0% 
     
       McNemar's test p-value: 0.001***   
 
Paired Sample are presented in Panels A and B while results for the Trailing Tailwind Paired 
Sample are presented in Panels C and D. 
Across all four panels I find that nearly 90 percent of the pairs are consistent disclosers 
(i.e., classified as either Informative or Uninformative). In addition, I find that more than half of 
the pairs do not disclose in either quarter. Thus, the panels suggest that the majority of firms do 
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not selectively disclose constant currency growth rates. However, a comparison of the 
probability of disclosure between headwind quarters and tailwind quarters is necessary to reject 
the hypothesis that companies are more likely to disclose in quarters with currency headwinds. 
The null hypothesis is marginal homogeneity, which is that the probability of disclosure is the 
same for both headwind and tailwind quarters: 
 !!"#$%&'()*+ + !,--$%(.")/()0 = !!"#$%&'()*+ + !1$"/+%*'()*+ 
which simplifies to: !,--$%(.")/()0 = !1$"/+%*'()*+ 
McNemar’s test is used to test for statistical significance (Agresti [2007], Agresti [2013]). The 
test statistic is: 
 $2 = ("!""#$%&'()%(*4"+#'),$-.%(-,)/"!""#$%&'()%(*6"+#'),$-.%(-,  
with df = 1. In all four panels I find that the probability of disclosure is greater during headwind 
quarters than during tailwind quarters (p-values £ 0.05). These results suggest that, although the 
majority of firms are consistent in disclosure choice, firms are more likely to disclose constant-
currency growth during headwind quarters than during tailwind quarters. 
5.4. Main Tests 
Table 14 presents the results from estimating Model (1) for the Paired Sample and the 
Trailing Tailwind Paired Sample. The dependent variables are Disc in Columns (1) and (3) and 
DiscNumeric in Columns (2) and (4). In each column, I find a positive and significant coefficient 
on Headwind (p-values £ 0.05). For the Paired Sample (Trailing Tailwind Paired Sample), the 
coefficient magnitudes suggest that, ceteris paribus, companies with a currency headwind are 
approximately 61 percent (40 percent) more likely than companies with a currency tailwind to 
disclose constant-currency revenue growth rates (e0.477 – 1 [e0..338 – 1]) and 63 percent (52  
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Table 14 
The association between currency headwinds and the disclosure of constant-currency 
growth rates 
This table presents logistic regression results for the paired samples in which the dependent 
variable is Disclose, an indicator variable that measures the disclosure of information about the 
effect of foreign currency fluctuations on revenue. In columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable 
is Disc, and is equal to one if a firm discloses a constant-currency revenue growth rate. In 
columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is DiscNumeric, and is equal to one if a firm 
discloses either a constant-currency revenue growth rate or provides information that allows for 
the calculation of a constant-currency revenue growth rate. The sample is constructed as 
disclosed in the text and variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. p-values (in 
parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by firm. p-values are two-tailed except for my variable of interest (italicized). ***, **, 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Paired Sample   Trailing Tailwind Paired Sample 
 (1)   (2)  (3)   (4) 
Variable Disc   DiscNumeric  Disc   DiscNumeric 
                                
Headwind 0.477 *** (0.000)   0.491 *** (0.000)  0.338 ** (0.025)  0.418 *** (0.007) 
DQ 1.204  (0.530)   1.999  (0.279)  1.201  (0.576)  1.984  (0.344) 
Earn 7.311 * (0.066)   10.440 *** (0.009)  7.784  (0.103)  11.140 ** (0.041) 
Ret 0.131  (0.697)   -0.239  (0.433)  -0.237  (0.663)  -0.451  (0.405) 
CFRatio -0.490  (0.434)   -1.103 * (0.099)  -0.509  (0.353)  -1.012  (0.102) 
ACC -3.085  (0.411)   -5.694  (0.118)  -0.683  (0.864)  -4.624  (0.279) 
Size 0.164 * (0.067)   0.131  (0.147)  0.087  (0.429)  0.091  (0.394) 
MTB -0.015  (0.879)   0.126  (0.204)  0.070  (0.523)  0.183  (0.149) 
RetVol -1.414  (0.604)   0.159  (0.932)  -0.370  (0.901)  0.691  (0.745) 
EarnVol -17.670 *** (0.006)   -18.060 *** (0.001)  -15.900 * (0.054)  -16.340 ** (0.023) 
NBSeg 0.581 ** (0.029)   0.587 ** (0.025)  0.547 * (0.078)  0.528 * (0.078) 
NGSeg -0.232  (0.428)   -0.296  (0.300)  -0.182  (0.567)  -0.396  (0.198) 
Age 0.008  (0.200)   0.014 ** (0.043)  0.010  (0.197)  0.018 ** (0.022) 
MA 0.126  (0.444)   0.098  (0.552)  0.428 * (0.079)  0.252  (0.316) 
SEO 0.208  (0.591)   -0.216  (0.568)  -0.427  (0.521)  -0.812  (0.232) 
SI -2.888  (0.352)   -2.067  (0.475)  -11.880  (0.110)  -4.439  (0.552) 
BigN -0.090  (0.846)   -0.197  (0.622)  0.462  (0.458)  0.201  (0.712) 
Analyst -0.058 *** (0.000)   -0.072 *** (0.000)  -0.043 ** (0.027)  -0.059 *** (0.004) 
Invest 0.678  (0.238)   1.000 * (0.072)  0.685  (0.327)  0.895  (0.210) 
Q2 0.005  (0.971)   -0.050  (0.720)  0.163  (0.576)  -0.091  (0.746) 
Q3 0.085  (0.693)   -0.072  (0.741)  0.407  (0.236)  0.217  (0.570) 
Q4 -0.128  (0.409)   -0.181  (0.239)  0.058  (0.806)  -0.080  (0.735) 
Constant -3.226 ** (0.029)   -3.530 ** (0.011)  -3.631 ** (0.047)  -3.627 ** (0.030) 
                       
Observations 1,346   1,346  598  598 
Year FE NO   NO  NO  NO 
Cluster FIRM   FIRM  FIRM  FIRM 
Pseudo R2 0.138    0.158   0.133    0.165  
Area Under ROC Curve 0.747    0.758    0.744    0.764  
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percent) more likely to disclose either constant-currency revenue growth rates or information that 
allows the calculation of constant-currency revenue growth rates (e0.491 – 1 [e0.418 – 1]). 
6. Conclusion 
Prior research finds that managers strategically disclose earnings benchmarks by 
choosing the year-prior earnings adjustment that leads to the largest increase or smallest decrease 
in earnings (Schrand and Walther [2000], Krische [2005]). Additionally, the non-GAAP 
literature provides evidence that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosures opportunistically 
(Black and Christensen [2009], Doyle et al. [2013], Curtis et al. [2014]). However, to my 
knowledge, prior research has not investigated the disclosure of non-GAAP revenue figures. In 
this paper, I provide the first documentation of non-GAAP revenue disclosures and investigate 
whether managers strategically disclose constant-currency revenue growth rates. 
I find that companies with a currency headwind are more likely to disclose constant-
currency revenue growth rates than companies with a currency tailwind. I find limited support 
for the hypothesis that the size of the currency headwind is associated with strategic disclosure. 
However, the design of my sample may limit my ability to adequately investigate this 
hypothesis. I also find some evidence suggesting that the strength of the information 
environment is associated with a decrease in the strategic disclosure of constant-currency 
revenue growth rates. 
These findings are important as they confirm the suspicions of regulators that companies 
make strategic non-GAAP disclosures, a behavior that regulators are attempting to discourage. 
Additionally, my findings should be of interest to investors as they provide an example of a way 
in which company disclosures may be biased. Also, by using geographic segment disclosures to 
identify opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures, my paper provides additional evidence of the 
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benefits of segment reporting requirements. Finally, my results should be of interest to 
researchers as they provide support for academic theories that managers are likely to make 
strategic disclosures when the cost of extracting the statistics is high.  
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8. Appendices 
8.1. Appendix A: Calculating the Effect of Exchange Rate Fluctuations on Revenue Growth 
The following are examples of how FXImpact is constructed for two actual observations. 
8.1.1. Example 1: Measurement Specialties Inc. Q1 2009 
This example demonstrates how FXImpact is constructed when the geographic segment 
data from the 10-K allows every segment to be tied to a specific foreign currency. I first obtain 
the geographic segment data from the 10-K of the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year of the 
quarter. In this case, for Q1 2009 the data comes from the 2008 10-K. The data, with the addition 
of currency codes, is shown in Figure 1. 
 2008 
 $ Currency 
United States $107,734  USD 
France 28,021  EUR 
Germany 19,323  EUR 
Ireland 12,969  EUR 
Switzerland 4,396  CHF 
China 55,940  CNY 
Total $228,383   
Figure 1 
After the segments have been tied to a currency, I calculate the average exchange rate for 
the current quarter (Q1 2009) and the year-prior quarter (Q1 2008). These appear in columns (D) 
and (C), respectively, in Figure 2. I then calculate the percentage change between the two 
quarters (column (E)), and then weight the change by the proportion of total revenue (column 
(F)). FXImpact is the sum of the individual currency impacts, or 7.1% in this example. Thus, I 
estimate that for Measurement Specialties Inc. Q1 2009, currency exchange rate fluctuations had 
a positive impact on reported revenue growth. Said another way, if exchange rates had remained 
unchanged from the prior year, I estimate that reported revenue would be 7.1% lower. 
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 (A) (B)  (C) (D) (E) (F) 
    Average Exchange Rate  
 $ %  Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Change FXImpact 
          (D) / (C) - 1 (B) * (E) 
USD $107,734  47.2%   1.00  1.00  –  0.0% 
EUR 60,313  26.4%   1.35  1.56  15.9%  4.2% 
CHF 4,396  1.9%   0.82  0.97  18.6%  0.4% 
CNY 55,940  24.5%   0.13  0.14  10.4%  2.5% 
Total $228,383  100.0%     7.1% 
Figure 2 
8.1.2. Example 2: Iron Mountain Inc. Q4 2008 
This example demonstrates how FXImpact is constructed when one or more geographic 
segments cannot be tied to a specific currency. As shown in Figure 3, Iron Mountain has a 
geographic segment, “Other International”, that I cannot tie to a specific currency. As a result, I 
use BUXX to approximate exchange rates for this segment. 
 2007 
 $ Currency 
United States $1,862,809  USD 
United Kingdom $368,008  GBP 
Canada $179,636  CAD 
Other International $319,582  BUXX 
Total $2,730,035   
Figure 3 
The remaining steps are the same as in the prior example and appear in Figure 4. In this 
example, I estimate that currency exchange rate fluctuations have a negative impact on reported 
revenue growth. If exchange rates had remained unchanged from the prior year, I estimate that 
reported revenue would be 5.6% higher. 
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 (A) (B)  (C) (D) (E) (F) 
    Average Exchange Rate  
 $ %  Q4 2007 Q4 2008 Change Impact 
          (D) / (C) - 1 (B) * (E) 
USD $1,862,809  68%   1.00  1.00  –  0.0% 
GBP 368,008  13%   2.04  1.57  (23.4%) -3.2% 
CAD 179,636  7%   1.02  0.83  (19.1%) -1.3% 
BUXX 319,582  12%   1.44  1.30  (9.9%) -1.2% 
Total $2,730,035  100%     -5.6% 
Figure 4 
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8.2. Appendix B: Variable definitions 
ACCi,t: Quarterly earnings minus cash flow from operations (for the three 
months ended in the current quarter) scaled by the book value of assets. 
Agei,t: The number of years since a firm appears in CRSP's monthly file. 
Analysti,t: The number of analysts in the last I/B/E/S consensus forecast prior to the 
earnings announcement. 
BigNi,t: An indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a Big N auditor, and zero 
otherwise. 
BUXXToTotali,t: The percent of total revenue from segments where BUXX is used in 
place of a specific currency. 
BUXXToForeigni,t: The percent of foreign revenue from segments where BUXX is used in 
place of a specific currency. 
CFRatioi,t: Quarterly cash flow from operations (for the three months ended in the 
current quarter) scaled by the book value of current liabilities. 
Disci,t: An indicator variable equal to one if a firm discloses a constant-currency 
growth rate in their earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. 
Disclosei,t: One of two indicator variables, Disc or DiscNumeric, that measure the 
disclosure of information about the effect of foreign currency 
fluctuations on revenue. 
DiscNumerici,t: An indicator variable equal to one if a firm discloses either a constant-
currency revenue growth rate or provides information that allows for the 
calculation of a constant-currency revenue growth rate, and zero 
otherwise. 
DQi,t: Disaggregation quality, a measure of the disaggregation of accounting 
data in the balance sheet and income statement, as measured by Chen et 
al. (2015). 
Earni,t: Quarterly earnings scaled by the book value of assets, winsorized at -3 
and 3. 
EarnVoli,t: The standard deviation of earnings (scaled by book value of assets) 
calculated using data from the last five years, with at least three years of 
data required. 
ForeignToTotali,t: The percent of total revenue from foreign segments. 
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FXImpacti,t: A proxy for the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on revenue growth. 
Please see Section 3.1 and Appendix A for calculation details. 
Headwindi,t: An indicator variable equal to one if FXImpact is negative, and zero 
otherwise. 
Investi,t: The proportion of outstanding shares that are held by institutional 
investors in the quarterly reporting period. 
MAi,t: An indicator variable equal to one if a firm makes a merger or 
acquisition in a given fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise, calculated using 
data from SDC Platinum. 
Magnitudei,t: The absolute value of FXImpact. 
MTBi,t: The market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities, scaled 
by the book value of total assets. 
NBSegi,t: The logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments. 
NGSegi,t: The logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments. 
Q2 (Q3 or Q4): An indicator variable equal to one if the current reporting quarter is the 
second (third or fourth) fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Reti,t: Contemporaneous stock returns in the fiscal quarter, calculated using 
CRSP monthly return data. 
RetVoli,t: Stock return volatility calculated using 12 months of monthly return data 
before the fiscal quarter ending date. 
SEOi,t: An indicator variable equal to one if a firm has a seasoned equity 
offering in a fiscal quarter, and zero otherwise, calculated using data 
from SDC Platinum. 
SIi,t: The amount of special items reported for the quarter, scaled by the book 
value of assets. 
Sizei,t: The logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the quarter. 
 
